The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: the Emerging Federal Law by Smith, Russell A. & Jones, Dallas L.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 5 
1965 
The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: the Emerging 
Federal Law 
Russell A. Smith 
University of Michigan Law School 
Dallas L. Jones 
The University of Michigan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and 
the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Russell A. Smith & Dallas L. Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: the Emerging 
Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1965). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss5/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE SUPREME COURT AND LABOR DISPUTE 
ARBITRATION: THE EMERGING 
FEDERAL LAW 
Russell A. Smith* and Dallas L. Jones""" 
W ITHIN the past few years, the United States Supreme Court has handed down a number of decisions of great significance 
to the labor dispute arbitration process. Some have been concerned 
with problems of arbitrability or arbitral authority; others with the 
availability and exclusivity of the arbitration process vis-a-vis al-
ternative legal remedies for breach of the labor agreement; and still 
others with the effect of a breach of obligation by one party to the 
labor agreement upon the obligations of the other party. We pro-
pose in this article to analyze these decisions, to attempt to 
categorize the different kinds of challenges to arbitral jurisdiction 
or authority which can be made, and to assess, insofar as this may 
be done, the import of the Court's decisions for the arbitration 
process. In a sense, we shall be dealing with the extent to which, 
under developing federal law, judicial review of the arbitration 
process is available. 
Our analysis will not take account, except incidentally, of lower 
federal and state court decisions rendered subsequent to the rele-
vant Supreme Court decisions. This is not to suggest that the 
questions we shall be considering are so clearly answered (at least 
in all cases) by the Court's decisions that judicial intervention is 
no longer sought to any appreciable extent; indeed, the fact appears 
to be the contrary. Judges continue to be confronted with many 
of these questions, and their reactions vary. At another time we 
expect to attempt a more complete survey and appraisal of the lower 
court decisions. Here, however, we shall attempt to reach some 
independent judgments on the issues we shall be discussing, recog-
nizing that our later, more complete examination may persuade 
us that some of the views here expressed should be modified. 
. . 
I. THE 1960 TRILOGY 
Any examination of the emerging federal law concerning the 
labor dispute arbitration process must begin with the famous 1960 
• Professor of Law, The University of Michigan; President, National Academy of 
Arbitrators.-Ed. 
• • Professor of Industrial Relations, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
The University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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Trilogy cases.1 These cases can be understood only in the light of 
the pertinent background. 
A. The Background Problems 
The problem facing the Court in these cases arose out of the 
fact that in this country the arbitrability of labor disputes usually 
requires the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. The only ex-
ceptions are so-called "minor disputes" in the case of railroads and 
airlines subject to the Railway Labor Act2 and disputes in certain 
industries, principally local public utilities, which in some states 
are subject to statutory arbitration procedures.3 With these excep-
tions, the arbitrator's authority derives basically from the agreement 
of the parties to the dispute, and his jurisdiction, as a matter of 
1. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). For a previous discussion of these cases 
and of background matters which to some extent is repeated here, see Smith, The 
Question of "Arbitrability"-The Roles of the Arbitrator, the Court, and the Parties, 
16 Sw. L.J. 1 (1962). See generally Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts-After• 
math of the Trilogy, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 360 (1962); Cornfield, Developing Standards 
for Determining Arbitrability of Labor Disputes by Federal Courts, 14 LAB. L.J. 564 
(1963); Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration, 36 NoTRE DAME LAW. 138 (1960); 
Gregory, Enforcement of Collective Agreements by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REv. 883 
(1962); Hays, .The Supreme Court and Labor Law, 60 CoLuM. L. REv. 901 (1960); 
Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 464 (1961); Smith & Jones, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of 
the· Arbitration Process, 62 Mica. L. REv. 1115 (1964); Symposium-Arbitration and 
the Courts, 58 Nw. UL. REv. 466, 494-520, 532-44 (1963). 
2. Under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1958), the National Railway 
Adjustment Board has been established with jurisdiction to hear and determine 
"disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing 
out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning 
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions .••. " 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1958). Similarly, 
under Title II of the act, interstate air carriers and unions representing their em-
ployees are required to establish their own "boards of adjustment" for the purpose 
of hearing and determining these kinds of disputes. 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1958). It is settled 
law that these agencies have primary jurisdiction over "minor disputes." See Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Pennsylvania 
R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River 
& Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957); Sigfred v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 230 F.2d 13 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956). See generally Daugherty, Arbitration by 
the National Railroad Adjustment Board, in ARBITRATION TODAY 93 (1955). 
3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 453.01-.18 (1952); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-603, 44-607 
(1949); Mo. REv. STAT. § 295.170 (1952); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.50-.64 (1957). State statutes 
providing for mandatory arbitration of labor disputes in public utilities should be 
considered in light of Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951), in which the Supreme Court held that under 
pre-emption principles the Wisconsin statute providing for compulsory arbitration 
cannot apply to employers subject to the National Labor Relations Act. Similarly, the 
Florida statute was held inoperative in Henderson v. State, 65 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1953). 
See generally Schwartz, Is Compulsory Arbitration Necessary?, 15 ARB. J. (n.s.) 189 
(1960). 
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legal theory, is limited to those matters which the parties by their 
agreement have entrusted to him for decision. 
It follows, according to traditional analysis of consensual arbi-
tration, that the arbitrator cannot be the final judge either of the 
existence or the scope of an agreement to arbitrate except where 
the parties have so agreed. Under our law, only courts or other 
statutory tribunals are empowered to enforce agreements, and an 
arrogation of jurisdiction or authority by an arbitrator may be cor-
rected by judicial review. On the other hand, it is likewise orthodox 
arbitration law that, if the parties have submitted an issue to ar-
bitration, they are bound by the result even though, had the issue 
been litigated, a like result reached by a trial court would have 
involved reversible error. 
The legal posture of voluntary arbitration in this country 
has made it possible for a party upon whom a demand for arbitra-
tion has been made to refuse to arbitrate and thus to put the 
proponent to the necessity of asking a court to compel arbitration. 
The respondent might predicate his resistance on any of the follow-
ing grounds: that a legally binding and enforceable agreement to 
arbitrate does not exist; that the specific issue raised by the pro-
ponent's demand is not arbitrable under a valid arbitration 
agreement; or that the proponent seeks a kind of relief that is 
beyond the contractual authority of the arbitrator to grant. Alterna-
tively, the respondent, having proceeded with arbitration while 
preserving his claim of non-arbitrability, may force judicial re-
view by refusing to comply with the award; in this situation the 
proponent is again forced to seek judicial assistance, this time for 
the enforcement of the award. When such questions have been 
raised in either of these situations, the courts have always been 
available to resolve the issues. 
There has been no special problem by virtue of this juridical 
fact where a valid (i.e., legally binding) agreement to arbitrate has 
stipulated in clear terms the issue or issues to be decided in a 
specific case as well as the scope of authority of the arbitrator. 
Typically, however, "grievance arbitration" (to use a labor rela-
tions colloquialism) rests on some provision in the basic collective 
bargaining agreement which makes arbitration the terminal point 
in the grievance procedure. The arbitration provision in such case 
is necessarily broad, even though it may contain exceptions and 
limitations. Typically, the agreement also provides, either in haec 
verba or in substance, for the arbitration only of disputes "concern-
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, ing the interpretation and application of some provmon or pro-
visions of this agreement." The use of this kind of contractual 
language makes it possible for a party opposing arbitration of 
a particular grievance (normally the employer) to contend that 
the claim is not arbitrable if the labor agreement cannot reasonably 
be construed to contain a commitment by such party on the 
basis of which the grievance could be sustained. In numerous in-
stances, courts accepting this approach have either stopped arbitra-
tion ad limine or refused to enforce awards. 
This may seem unobjectionable, but the difficulty in most 
such cases has been that the disposition of the issue of arbitrability 
thus presented has required the court to examine and interpret one 
or more of the substantive provisions of the labor agreement and 
thus, in reality, to decide the merits of the grievance under the 
guise of determining arbitrability. This kind of judicial interven-
tion has been severely criticized on the ground, basically, that it 
was the arbitrator's, not the court's, interpretation of the agree-
ment for which the parties supposedly bargained when they agreed 
to use the arbitration process.4 
Judicial intervention probably has occurred with greatest fre-
quency and success where the claim made by the party seeking 
arbitration has rested either on an express provision of the labor 
agreement which, on its face, did not appear to support the claim or 
on an obligation not stated expressly but alleged to be implicit in 
the agreement. Illustrative of the former is the (one-time) leading 
Cutler-Hammer decision,5 in which it was held that an express 
contractual commitment by the employer to meet and discuss with 
the Union "the payment of a bonus" could not support a grievance 
based on the employer's refusal to pay a bonus following such 
discussion. Illustrative of the latter are a number of cases where 
the grievance protested the subcontracting or contracting out of 
work of a kind which had been or could be performed by bargain-
ing unit employees and the agreement contained no specific 
provision on this subject.6 
4. See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration in the Light of the Lincoln Mills 
Case, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFill ANN. MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF AIUlI• 
TRATORS, .ARBITRATION AND THE LAw 24 (1959); Mayer, Judicial "Bulls" in the Delicate 
China Shop of Labor Arbitration, 2 LAB. L.J. 502 (1951); Scoles, Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 616 (1950); Summers, 
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 2 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. l (1952). 
5. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 
67 N.Y.S.2d 317, affd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). 
6. See, e.g., Independent Petroleum Workers v. Standard Oil Co., 275 F.2d 706 
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Problems concerning the role of the judiciary in relation to 
the arbitration process eventually reached the Supreme Court. The 
initial and most important development occurred in 1957, when 
the Court in Lincoln Mills decided that a provision for the use 
of arbitration as the terminal point in the grievance procedure 
was specifically enforceable as a matter of federal law under section 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, provided the 
jurisdictional requirements were met.7 This decision laid to rest 
for all practical purposes the hoary common-law judicial reaction 
against the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 
In addition, the decision meant that the Court would inevitably 
have to deal with the other kinds of arbitrability issues to which we 
have referred. The initial confrontation occurred in 1960. 
B. Analysis of the 1960 Cases 
The so-called "Trilogy" of 1960 consisted of three cases in 
which, in each instance, the union involved was the United Steel-
workers of America. The cases have been stated, dissected, and 
critically examined to the point that we now have a wealth of 
literature concerning them. A brief review of the issues presented 
and the decisions is, nevertheless, desirable as part of our back-
ground recital. 
In Warrior b Gulf,8 the grievances brought by the Union pro-
tested the contracting out of certain maintenance work clearly 
encompassed by the bargaining unit. There was a layoff situation 
at the time the grievances were filed which, in part, was due to 
the contracting out of such work. The labor agreement was silent 
on the subject of contracting out; however, it undoubtedly con-
(7th Cir. 1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 269 F.2d 633 (5th 
Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Dairy Workers v. Grand Rapids Milk Div., 160 
F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mich. 1958); United Dairy Workers v. Detroit Creamery Co., 30 
CCH Lab. Cas. 1J 70ll5 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1956); Crivelli v. University Loudspeakers, Inc., 
195 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1959). Contra, Local 1912, International Ass'n of Machinists 
v. United States Potash Co., 270 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1959). 
7. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See generally 
Aaron, On First Looking Into the Lincoln Mills Decision, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
TWELFTH ANN, MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION AND THE 
LAw 1 (1959); Bickel &: Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process-The 
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957); Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdic-
tion To Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REv. 1247 (1957); Cox, 
Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1959); Feinsinger, Enforce-
ment of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REv. 1261 
(1957); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 635 (1959). 
8. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
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tained recognition, wage, and seniority provisions. The agreement 
also contained a no-strike provision. Excluded from the arbitration 
process were matters that were "strictly a function of management," 
but otherwise the arbitration clause was unusually broad. It stated: 
"Should differences arise between the Company and the 
Union or its members ... as to the meaning and application 
of the provisions of this Agreement, or should any local trouble 
of any kind arise, there shall be no suspension of work on 
account of such differences, but an earnest effort shall be made 
to settle such differences in the following manner [referring to 
the grievance and arbitration procedure]." 
In a suit by the Union under section 301 to compel arbitration, 
the district court granted the Company's motion to dismiss,9 hold-
ing that the agreement did not confide in an arbitrator the right to 
review the defendant's business judgment in contracting out work 
and that contracting out was strictly a function of management 
within the meaning of the exclusionary language of the arbitration 
clause. The court of appeals affirmed,10 but the Supreme Court 
reversed and the Company was forced to arbitrate. 
In American Manufacturing,U the question was whether the 
Company was required to submit to arbitration a grievance based 
on its refusal to reinstate an employee who had suffered an indus-
trial injury. In a consent decree settlement of a workmen's com-
pensation claim, the employee had been awarded a lump-sum 
payment plus costs on the basis that he had incurred a permanent 
partial disability of twenty-five per cent. His subsequent demand 
for reinstatement was predicated on a statement by his physician 
(who had supported the earlier claim of permanent partial dis-
ability) that the employee "is now able to return to his former 
duties without danger to himself or to others." Contractually, the 
demand was based on a provision in the seniority article of the 
labor agreement which recognized "the principle of seniority as a 
factor in the selection of employees for promotion, transfer, layoff, 
re-employment, and filling of vacancies, where ability and efficiency 
are equal." The arbitration clause was standard in that it per-
mitted arbitration of "any disputes, misunderstandings, differ-
ences or grievances arising between the parties as to the meaning, 
interpretation and application of the provisions of this agreement." 
9. 168 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958). 
10. 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959). 
11. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
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The district court and court of appeals refused to require the 
Company to arbitrate,12 although they disagreed on the basis of 
decision. The district court used an estoppel theory; the court of 
appeals held that estoppel did not go to the question of arbitra-
bility, but it examined the cited seniority provisions and concluded 
that the grievance was "a frivolous, patently baseless one" and hence 
not within the arbitration clause. Again, the Supreme Court re-
versed and ordered arbitration. 
In Enterprise,13 the grievance sought the reinstatement of 
certain employees who had been discharged because they had 
left their jobs in protest against the discharge of a fellow em-
ployee. The Company refused to arbitrate the grievance, but 
was ordered to do so by a federal district court. The arbitrator's 
decision reduced the penalty of discharge to a ten-day disciplinary 
layoff and ordered the grievants reinstated with oack pay adjusted 
for the ten-day penalty. The decision was handed down five days 
after the labor agreement had expired, and the Company refused 
to comply with the award on the ground, inter alia, that the 
arbitrator lacked the authority either to order back pay for any 
period subsequent to the expiration date of the labor agreement or 
to order reinstatement. The district court directed the Company 
to comply with the award,14 but the court of appeals reversed on the 
ground urged by the Company.15 The Supreme Court, however, 
once more upheld the authority of the arbitrator. 
Seven Justices concurred in these decisions. Mr. Justice Whit-
taker dissented, and Mr. Justice Black did not participate. The 
principal opinion for the majority was written by Mr. Justice 
Douglas. Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not join in this opinion, but 
concurred in the results in each case. Justices Brennan and Harlan, 
while joining the Douglas opinion in each case, also added "a word" 
in Warrior & Gulf and American Manufacturing. 
The decisions have been viewed as indicating a strong federal 
policy favoring the arbitration process as a means of resolving dis-
putes concerning the interpretation or application of collective 
bargaining agreements and as restricting the role of the courts 
in this area.16 This interpretation, we think, is correct, although 
12. 264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959). 
13. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
14. 168 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. W. Va. 1958). 
15. 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959). 
16. See, e.g., Davey, supra note l; Gregory, supra note I, at 886; Hays, supra note 
1, at 919-34; Meltzer, supra note 1, at 485-87; Smith, supra note l; Wallen, Recent 
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it derives its principal support from the content of the opinions, 
especially the opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, rather than from 
the specific dispositions of the issues presented. That is to say, we 
think Warrior & Gulf and American Manufacturing were correctly 
decided even if the Court had adopted the Cutler-Hammer approach 
as the basis for determining whether to order the cases to go to 
arbitration. The decision in Enterprise would be more difficult to 
defend on the basis of pre-existing standards, and, apart from what 
was said in the opinions, it provides some support for the view 
that the Court intended to lay dmvn some new principles of labor 
dispute arbitration law.17 In any event, the Court in fact expressly 
repudiated Cutler-Hammer and like approaches to arbitrability 
issues18 and in broad and sweeping language directed the courts 
not to intercept the arbitration process and not to upset arbitration 
results except where judicial intervention is warranted under 
standards enunciated in the opinions. 
The problem of arbitrability remains for courts, however, be-
cause the Supreme Court could not escape the basic proposition 
that so long as arbitration is consensual, arbitrability must be a 
litigable issue. This was expressly recognized in Warrior & Gulf 
(although, perhaps significantly, only in a footnote to the opinion19) 
and is especially important in the context of the standard type of 
arbitration clause contained in the American Manufacturing agree-
ment. The Court could have held, giving literal effect to the 
language of this provision, that the parties thereby indicated an 
intent to give the arbitrator the authority to determine the arbitra-
bility issue, along with other issues, as a matter of contract interpre-
tation. But despite its strong sympathy for the arbitration process, 
the Court was unwilling to accept this "bootstraps" approach to 
the resolution of the issue of arbitrability, presumably (the rationale 
not being explicated) because it did not believe the parties, by 
using such standard arbitration language, intended to confer upon 
the arbitrator the authority finally to determine challenges to his 
authority or jurisdiction.20 We think this assessment of contractual 
Supreme Court Decisions on Arbitration, 63 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 295, 299 (1961); Welling• 
ton, Judicial Review of the Promise To Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 471, 483 (1962). 
17. See Smith, supra note 1, at 9 n.19. 
18. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960). 
19. 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7. 
20. The concurring opinion of Justices Brennan and Harlan in the Trilogy is more 
explicit. Justice Brennan points out that "the arbitration promise is itself a con-
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intent was correct, although it is' probable that in the vast pre-
ponderance of arbitration cases decided even prior to the Trilogy 
the parties have, in fact, acquiesced in the arbitrator's determina-
tion of such jurisdictional issues. 
Thus, despite the Trilogy, the judiciary retains a role in relation 
to the arbitration process in keeping the arbitrator within the 
bounds of his authority under the contract. The problem for the 
courts is to determine the appropriate areas and bases of interven-
tion or review, giving due regard to the Trilogy and later pro-
nouncements by the Supreme Court. 
Considering at this point only the 1960 decisions, the following 
propositions seem to have been declared as a matter of federal 
substantive law with respect to labor agreements subject to enforce-
ment under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 
1947: 
(I) The existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the 
arbitrability of a specific grievance sought to be arbitrated 
under such an agreement, are questions for the courts ulti-
mately to decide (if such an issue is presented for judicial 
determination) unless the parties have expressly given an arbi-
trator the authority to make a binding determination of such 
matters.21 
(2) A court should hold a grievance non-arbitrable under 
a valid agreement to use arbitration as the terminal point in 
the grievance procedure only if the parties have clearly in-
dicated their intention to exclude the subject matter of the 
grievance from the arbitration process, either by expressly so 
stating in the arbitration clause or by otherwise clearly and 
unambiguously indicating such intention. 
(3) Evidence of intention to exclude a claim from the arbi-
tract" and "the parties are free to make that promise as broad or as narrow as they 
wish • • •• " He states further: 
"In American, the Court deals with a request to enforce the 'standard' form of 
arbitration clause, one that provides for the arbitration of 'any disputes, mis-
understandings, differences or grievances arising between the parties as to the 
meaning, interpretation and application of this agreement ••. .' Since the arbi-
tration clause itself is part of the agreement, it might be argued that a dispute 
as to the meaning of that clause is for the arbitrator. But the Court rejects this 
position, saying that the threshold question, the meaning of the arbitration 
clause itself, is for the judge unless the parties clearly state to the contrary. 
However, the Court finds that the meaning of that 'standard' clause is simply that 
the parties have agreed to arbitrate any dispute which the moving party asserts 
to involve construction of the substantive provisions of the contract, because such 
a dispute necessarily does involve such a construction.'' 
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 571 (1959). 
21. Of course, if the very existence of a binding agreement to submit issues of 
arbitrability to arbitral determination is placed in issue before a court, the court 
must necessarily determine whether such an agreement has been made. 
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tration process should not be found in a determination that 
the labor agreement could not properly be interpreted in such 
manner as to sustain the grievance on its merits, for this is a 
task assigned by the parties to the arbitrator, not the courts. 
(4) An award should not be set aside as beyond the authority 
conferred upon the arbitrator, either because of claimed error 
in interpretation of the agreement or because of alleged lack 
of authority to provide a particular remedy, where the arbi-
tral decision was or, if silent, might have been the result of 
the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement; if, however, 
it was based not on the contract but on an obligation found 
to have been imposed by law, the award should be set aside 
unless the parties have expressly authorized the arbitrator to 
dispose of this as well as any contract issue.22 
22. This proposition, of course, derives from the disposition and opm1on in 
Enterprise, where the attack on the award was predicated on the lack of authority 
in the arbitrator to make any award after the expiration date of the labor agreement 
under which the grievance arose and under which the arbitration process was 
instituted. The proposition as stated may be broader than actually intended by the 
Court. If, for example, an arbitrator renders an award in conflict with some specific 
provision in the agreement limiting his authority, a question would be raised that 
was not involved in the facts of Enterprise. 
In Local 725, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Standard Oil Co., 186 F. Supp. 
895 (N.D. 1960), the judge derived the following six general principles from the 1960 
Trilogy: (1) Arbitration is a -matter of contract and a party cannot be required to 
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to do; (2) the courts 
have the exclusive duty of determining whether the reluctant party has breached the 
promise to arbitrate-this is not a question to be left to the arbitrator; (3) the court's 
inquiry is confined and limited to determining whether the reluctant party did agree 
to arbitrate the grievance-it is not for the court to consider the merits of the 
grievance; (4) where the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite 
broad, doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration; (5) the parties to an arbitra-
tion agreement may exclude any disputes or grievances; (6) the arbitration agreement, 
being a matter of contract, should be interpreted in accordance with the intention 
of the parties as therein expressed and in the light of circumstances surrounding the 
negotiations for and execution of the agreement. 
See also Report of Special Warrior & Gulf Committee, in 1963 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw 196-97, in which the following six general 
propositions with respect to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements were 
said to have been established by the Trilogy: "(l) Arbitration is a matter of contract, 
not of law; parties are required to arbitrate only if, and to the extent that, they have 
agreed to do so. (2) The question of arbitrability under a collective bargaining 
agreement is a question for the courts, not for the arbitrator, unless the parties 
specifically provide otherwise in their agreement. (3) Since arbitration under a col-
lective bargaining agreement is an alternative to strike, rather than to litigation, as in 
commercial arbitration, the traditional judicial reluctance toward compelling parties 
to arbitrate is not applicable to labor arbitration. (4) When the parties have provided 
for arbitration of all disputes as to the application or interpretation of a collective 
bargaining agreement, the courts should order arbitration of any grievance which 
claims that management has violated the provisions of the agreement, irrespective 
of the courts' views as to the merits of the claim. (5) When the parties have coupled 
with a provision for arbitration of all disputes a clause specifically excepting certain 
matters from arbitration, the courts should order arbitration of a claim that the 
employer has violated the agreement unless it may be said with positive assurance 
that the subject matter falls within the exception clause. (6). An arbitral award 
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An intriguing question not actually presented and not expressly 
considered in these cases is whether, as a matter of federal law, an 
arbitrator faced with any of the challenges to his jurisdiction or 
authority presented in these cases is required to decide such an 
issue the way the Court decided it (i.e., in favor of jurisdiction or 
authority) or be subject to reversal if his contrary decision should 
be brought before a court. It has usually been assumed that the 
arbitrator, despite the Trilogy, has full discretion to decide any 
issue properly before him. Thus, for example, on facts like those 
of Warrior & Gulf he has the authority to decide whether the griev-
ance protesting subcontracting is arbitrable.23 However, the positive 
statements of Justice Douglas in American Manufacturing and 
Warrior & Gulf in support of the arbitrability of the grievances 
there considered can be read as mandatory rules of interpretation 
of the relevant contract provisions, and some arbitrators have 
regarded the Trilogy as dispositive of these kinds of arbitrability 
issues.24 
Actually, we believe it makes no difference in cases like these 
whether an arbitrator holds the grievance arbitrable and then 
denies it on the merits (if this should be his conclusion) or dismisses 
it as non-arbitrable. Either form of decision would have to be 
predicated on the same basic contractual analysis, namely, that 
there is no provision in the labor agreement which supports the 
grievance. The legal and practical results are, therefore, the same, 
and the point of the matter is that either way the arbitrator writes 
his opinion he is in fact deciding the merits. For this reason, we 
doubt that the Court would upset an arbitrator's holding of non-
arbitrability. 
II. THE 1962 TRILOGY 
On June 18, 1962, the Supreme Court rendered another triplet 
should be enforced (absent fraud or similar vitiating circumstance) unless 
0
it is clear 
that the arbitrator has based that award upon matters outside the contract he is 
charged with interpreting and applying." 
23. See, e.g., Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1213 (Smith 1962) (subcontract-
ing dispute held arbitrable). Caterpillar Tractor Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 875 (Dworkin 1962) 
(procedurally defective claim held not arbitrable); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 62-2 P-H 
LAn. AllB. SERv. ,r 8761 (McCoy 1962) (revision of labor grade held not arbitrable); 
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 944 (White 1961) (subcontracting dispute held 
arbitrable); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 1912 (Ryder 1961) (sub-
contracting dispute held arbitrable). 
24. See, e.g., Lake Mills Redi-Mix, Inc., 62-2 P-H LAB. AllB. SERV. ,I 8377 (Mueller 
1962); Union Asbestos &: Rubber Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 72 (Volz 1962); Forse Corp., 39 Lab. 
Arb. 709 (Dworkin 1962). 
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of decisions of substantial importance to the labor dispute arbi-
tration process. In Sinclair Refining Company v. Atkinson25 it was 
held that a federal injunction against a strike over arbitrable mat-
ters was barred by the Norris-LaGuardia Act,26 even though the 
strike was in breach of a contractual no-strike pledge. In the com-
panion case of Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Company21 (which we 
shall refer to as Sinclair 11) the Court held, among other things, that 
the employer could bring a section 301 suit for damages against 
the Union for alleged violation of a no-strike provision, since the 
arbitration clause did not provide for the submission of employer 
grievances against the Union. In Drake Bakeries v. Local 50,28 on 
the other hand, it was held that the employer's suit for damages 
for breach of a no-strike covenant was barred because, under the 
grievance procedure contained in the applicable agreement, the 
employer's claim was an arbitrable matter and the arbitration 
process should have been used. 
Sinclair, which involved the availability of a federal injunction 
against violation of a no-strike provision, has only limited relevance 
to the subject of this article. With respect to it we will say only 
that, while the majority opinion makes a fairly persuasive case 
based upon legislative history, the Court had indicated in earlier 
decisions that it was quite capable of finding grounds upon which 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act could be considered inapplicable when 
policy considerations were deemed to require this result.29 In our 
judgment, the Court's refusal to do so in this instance was a dis-
service to the arbitration process and difficult to understand in the 
25. 370 U.S. 195 (1962). 
26. 29 u.s.c. §§ 101-15 (1958). 
27. 370 U.S. 238 (1962). 
28. 370 U.S. 254 (1962). 
29. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (suit to 
obtain the specific performance of a contract to arbitrate under § 301); Brotherhood of 
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957) (suit to enjoin strikes 
where Congress provided a compulsory method of determining grievances by the 
National Railroad Adjustment Board); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 
U.S. 768 (1952) (suit to enjoin the use of a discriminatot}' contract for purposes of 
ousting employees from their jobs); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 
323 U.S. 210 (1944) (suit to enjoin discriminatory practices where no administrative 
remedy is available); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (suit to enforce 
the statutory duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act); Virginia Ry. 
v. System Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (suit to enforce employer's 
duty to bargain under the Railway Labor Act). See generally Comment, Labor Injunc-
tions and Judge-Made Labor Law-The Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 
(1962). 
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light of the favorable attitude toward arbitration exhibited in the 
1960 decisions.30 
Sinclair II and Drake Bakeries are both important and germane 
to our present discussion. Each case involved, among other things, 
the questions whether the employer's claim for damages against the 
union for alleged violation of a no-strike pledge was arbitrable, 
and, if so, whether in consequence a damage action under section 
301 was unavailable to the employer. The opinions and decisions, 
especially in Drake Bakeries, appear to give an affirmative answer 
to the second of these questions. This seems to us to be a proper 
development of federal labor law. ·where the parties have made 
the arbitration process available for the resolution of a particular 
issue, it is sound and consistent with the Court's general approba-
tion of the arbitration process to require that that process rather 
than litigation be used. 
For present purposes the Court's dispositions of the arbitra-
bility issues are the most significant aspects of the cases. Mr. Justice 
White's opinion in Sinclair II reiterated that "under our decisions, 
whether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as 
what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the 
Court on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties."31 
The 1960 Trilogy was cited. In Drake Bakeries this position was 
reaffirmed.82 A question which the Court had to face and decide 
in each case, therefore, was whether under the particular agreement 
before it the employer's claim for damages against the union was 
an arbitrable issue. The basis of the Court's determination of this 
question constitutes its major 1962 contribution to the problems 
we are here considering. 
The contract grievance and arbitration procedure involved in 
Sinclair II contained a broad definition of the term "grievance" 
30. For valuable discussions of these cases, see Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective 
Agreements, 63 CoLUM L. REv. 1027 (1963); Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 
10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 292 (1963); Dannett, Norris-LaGuardia and Injunctions in Labor 
Arbitration Cases, N.Y.U. 16TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON LAB. 275 (1963); Kinvood, The 
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Contracts, 15 LAB. L.J. 111 (1964); Marshall, 
Enforcing the Labor Contract, 14 LAB. L.J. 353 (1963); Vladeck, Injunctive Relief 
Against Strikes in Breach of the Labor Agreement, N.Y.U. 16TH ANN. CONFERENCE ON 
LAB. 289 (1963); Weiss, Labor Arbitration and the 1961-1962 Supreme Court, 
51 GEo. L.J. 284 (1963); Wellington &: Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the 
Political Process, 72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963). 
31. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962). 
32. Mr. Justice White stated: "As was true in Atkinson ••• the issue of ar}?itrability 
is a question for the courts and is to be determined by the contract entered into by the 
parties." Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 256 
(1962). 
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which did not necessarily exclude a claim by the employer that the 
union had disregarded some obligation under the agreement.83 
However, the provisions specifying the various steps of the griev-
ance procedure referred only to grievances presented by employees 
or the Union's Workmen's Committee. Moreover, the arbitration 
clause stated that an arbitration board "shall consider only in-
dividual or local committee grievances arising under the applica-
tion of the currently existing agreement" and expressly provided 
that arbitration could be invoked only at the option of the Union. 
For these reasons, the Court thought it "unquestionably clear that 
the contract here involved is not susceptible to a construction that 
the company was bound to arbitrate its claim against the union 
for breach of the undertaking not to strike."34 By way of footnote, 
the Court significantly added this statement: "'We do not need to 
reach, therefore, the question of whether, under the contract in-
volved here, breaches of the no-strike clause are 'grievances,' i.e., 
'differences relating to wages, hours, or working conditions,' or 
'grievances' in the more general sense of the term."85 
In Drake Bakeries, on the other hand, the grievance procedure 
provisions of the contract began with a broad undertaking that the 
parties would "attempt to adjust all complaints, disputes or griev-
ances arising between them involving questions of interpretation 
or application of any clause or matter covered by this contract or 
any act or conduct or relation between the parties hereto, directly 
or indirectly." Moreover, the specified methods of adjustment, in-
cluding arbitration, did not expressly exclude employer complaints 
or grievances, and it was provided that, if a matter was not settled 
under the intra-plant procedures, "then either party shall have 
the right to refer the matter to arbitration as herein provided." 
The Court, finding these provisions easily distinguishable from 
those involved in Sinclair II, held that an employer complaint based 
upon an alleged breach of the no-strike pledge was arbitrable 
under the terms of the agreement and that the employer was not 
excused from its duty to use the arbitration process. 
It seems to us that the Court's interpretations of the respective 
33. The contract defined a grievance to be " •.. any difference regarding wages, 
hours or working conditions between the parties hereto or between the Employer and 
an employee covered by this working agreement which might arise within any plant 
or within any region of operations." Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 250 
(1962). 
34. Id. at 241. 
35. Id. at 242 n.3. 
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agreements concerning the arbitrability of the employer's claim of 
breach of the no-strike provision were correct. The negative impli-. 
cation the Court found in the language used in the Sinclair II 
contract provisions detailing the grievance and arbitration pro-
cedures was entirely plausible, but not necessarily clear beyond 
peradventure. However, the result reached was correct in the light 
of the further facts (which the Court noted but did not rely 
upon) that the parties in another provision recognized that there 
was a category of "general disputes" which were to be subject to 
negotiation, with no mention of arbitration, and that the no-
strike clause recognized, by clear implication, a right to strike on 
matters which could not be "the subject of a grievance."36 Thus, as 
stated in the opinion, "the parties did not intend to commit all of 
their possible disputes and the whole scope of their relationship 
to the grievance and arbitration procedures .... "37 
The decision in Drake Bakeries presents· greater difficulties. We 
think the Court correctly interpreted the contract there involved 
as meaning that employer grievances were intended to be amenable 
to the grievance and arbitration procedures, especially in the light 
of the very broad no-strike provision contained in the agreement. 
But a different interpretation could scarcely have been considered 
arbitrary or capricious. Moreover, the Court might well have dif-
ferentiated between the arbitrability of the employer's claim that 
the Union had violated its no-strike pledge and the availability of 
the arbitration process to provide a damage remedy. At least prior 
to the 1960 Trilogy, there had been substantial disagreement among 
arbitrators38 and among courts89 on the question whether this 
kind of remedy was contemplated by the parties in establishing 
36. The no-strike clause provided that "there shall be no strikes ..• (1) For any 
cause which is or may be the subject of a grievance ••• or (2) For any other cause, 
except upon written notice by Union to Employer .••. " 
The provision covering "general disputes" provided that disputes general in 
character or affecting a large number of employees were to be negotiated between the 
parties. Id. at 241 n.l. 
37. Id. at 241-42. 
38. See Reading St. Ry., 8 Lab. Arb. 930 (Simkin 1937); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton 
Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 1061 (Crawford 1958). See generally ELKOURI &: ELKoURI, How 
AlulilllATION 'WORKS 47 (1960). 
39. See Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d 
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957) (within); UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable 
Indus., 242 F.2d 536 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957); United Elec. Workers 
v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954); Markel Elec. Prods., Inc. 
v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953). See generally Erzine, Nadir of the 
No-Strike Clause, 8 I.An. L.J. 769, 791 (1957); Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy 
Power, 48 VA. L. REv. 1199, 1204 (1962). 
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the arbitration process. It is arguable that, except as the parties 
expressly indicated otherwise, they intended to confine the arbi-
trator to the kinds of remedies traditional to the arbitration 
process or at least intended to exclude a remedy which would tax 
the capabilities of the arbitration process by presenting problems 
(of proof, prolonged hearings, and the like) not ordinarily present 
and not necessarily within the expertise of the arbitrator.40 
The question arises whether Sinclair II and Drake Bakeries laid 
down federal rules of interpretation that are to be mandatory upon 
arbitrators when faced with similar arbitrability issues. In discussing 
this problem in relation to the 1960 Trilogy, we concluded that 
the Court would very likely not permit the arbitrator's decision to 
be reversed no matter which way he decided the issue of arbitra-
bility, because, either way, he is really deciding the merits. But 
analysis of the two 1962 cases with respect to this question involves 
different considerations. 
The essential point of the 1960 cases is that the Court there 
issued a caveat against judicial interference with 'the arbitration 
process so long as the arbitrator is deciding a contract issue, includ-
ing an issue of arbitrability which is inherently intertwined with 
the contract merits of the particular grievance. In the 1962 cases 
the narrow question presented was whether the employer's suit for 
damages should be stayed on the ground that the arbitration process 
was available to the employer. Approval of the principle that the 
arbitration process, where it is available, should be used in the 
first instance left the Court with the kind of issue presented in 1960, 
namely, whether it should compel arbitration. In the two cases 
different results were reached. In neither case did the Court state 
(nor, for that matter, did it in 1960) that, if the arbitrability issue 
had been presented to an arbitrator in the first instance, he would 
have been free to make an independent, final decision on that issue 
contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court. 
It seems to us to be inescapable, however, that the Court in 
Sinclair II did indeed lay down a federal rule of interpretation which 
cannot with impunity be disregarded by arbitrators. This is almost 
necessarily so as a matter of inherent logic, since the Court refused 
40. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Drake Bakeries, took this position. See Drake 
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 267 (1962). Consider 
also the following language by Arbitrator Crawford: "Damages for strikes and lockouts 
in violation of the contract is a remedy normal to the Courts-but not to arbitration. 
When parties seek such extra-arbitral remedy, the proper tribunal is, and has been, 
the courts .... " Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 1061, 1064 (1958). 
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to permit the employer's claim in that case to be submitted to the 
arbitration process. There is an obvious distinction between this 
kind of result and the results reached in the 1960 Trilogy and in 
Drake Bakeries, where the Court required the matter to be sub-
mitted to arbitration. The Court, standing at the pinnacle of the 
federal judiciary, has the ultimate authority when the legal founda-
tion is section 301 of the LMRA of 1947. When it decides that under 
certain kinds of contract provisions the intention to exclude a given 
claim from the arbitration process is so clear that arbitration should 
not be ordered despite the 1960 decisions, it must surely be apply-
ing the basic rule, recognized in the 1960 Trilogy and reiterated in 
the 1962 cases, that arbitrability is ultimately a matter for the judi-
ciary. When the decision is against arbitrability (i.e., against re-
quiring the matter even to be submitted to the arbitration process), 
there is obviously no room for a contrary interpretation by an 
arbitrator. Moreover, the opinion in Sinclair II uses language, noted 
above, which indicates that the Court could not conceive of any 
other interpretation of the pertinent contract provisions. 
Drake Bakeries, however, presents additional problems. First, 
in this case, unlike Sinclair II, the Court ordered arbitration as it 
had done in the 1960 Trilogy cases; thus the interpretation of the 
decision in relation to the respective roles of court and arbitrator 
becomes more difficult. Moreover, the reasons for requiring arbitra-
tion which explain the 1960 cases were applicable to some extent in 
Drake Bakeries. & in Warrior & Gulf, there was a broad arbitration 
clause, and as in American Manufacturing, there was an alleged 
breach of a specific provision of the labor agreement. Therefore, it 
could not reasonably be contended, as in Sinclair II, that the claim 
was clearly intended to be excluded from the arbitration process. 
In addition, the arbitrability issue in Drake Bakeries was partly 
intertwined with the merits, as in the 1960 cases, since there was a 
serious question whether the union's conduct constituted a strike 
within the meaning of the agreement. This issue was peculiarly 
within the expertise of an arbitrator. On the other hand, whether 
the parties intended to empower the arbitrator to enforce the no-
strike provision and to provide a damage remedy were issues not 
linked with the merits. Therefore, in contrast with the 1960 cases, 
in this situation if the arb'itrator dismisses the claim it makes a 
difference whether he does so on the merits or on the ground that 
he lacks arbitral jurisdiction or authority. A decision predicated on 
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the latter ground would permit the employer to pursue his judicial 
remedy. 
Our view is that Drake Bakeries should not be interpreted as 
laying dmvn a mandatory federal rule of construction, binding upon 
an arbitrator, even with respect to the kind of contract provisions 
and the fact situation there presented. By the same token, we would 
argue that the case does not indicate how the Court would react 
on the issues of arbitrability and arbitral authority under a bilateral 
arbitration provision where there is clearly a breach of the no-strike 
clause and the only issue concerns the nature of the remedy. Our 
guess is that the Court would order the employer to submit his 
claim for damages or other relief to the arbitration process, even 
though the issues do not lend themselves as readily to arbitration 
as in Drake Bakeries. Likewise, we feel confident that, if the 
arbitrator were to reject jurisdiction (at least over a claim for 
damages), he would not be held to have committed reversible error. 
III. THE 1964 CASES 
Three cases of major importance, and t1vo of uncertain or little 
significance, in the development of federal law concerning the labor 
dispute arbitration process were decided by the Supreme Court in 
1964. Each involved an issue or issues which we subsume under 
the general caption "arbitrability and related matters." In the first 
category are Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,41 Local 721 v. 
Needham Packing Co.,42 and John Wiley & Sons) Inc. v. Living-
ston.43 In the second category are Independent Petroleum Workers 
of America) Inc. v. American Oil Co.,44 and Piano and Instrument 
Workers Union v. W. W. Kimball Co.45 
A. The Carey Case 
JUE was the certified bargaining representative of "all produc-
tion and maintenance employees" at the plant where the contro-
versy arose; "salaried, technical" employees were specifically ex-
cluded. JUE and Westinghouse were parties to an agreement which 
provided for arbitration of unresolved disputes, including those 
involving the "interpretation, application or claimed violation" of 
41. 375 U.S. 261 (1964). 
42. 376 U.S. 247 (1964). 
43. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
44. 377 U.S. 930 (1964), rehearing den., 85 Sup. Ct. 639 (1965). 
45. 85 Sup. Ct. 441 (1964). 
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the agreement. IUE filed a grievance asserting that certain employees 
represented by Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions (Federa-
tion) were performing production and maintenance work. Federa-
tion represented a bargaining unit of "all salaried, technical" 
employees; from this unit "all production and maintenance em-
ployees" were excluded. Westinghouse refused to arbitrate, claim-
ing the controversy concerned a representation matter within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, al-
though the Board's jurisdiction had not, in fact, been invoked. 
IUE petitioned the Supreme Court of New York for an order com-
pelling arbitration, but such order was refused on the ground urged 
by Westinghouse. This decision was affirmed on appeal through the 
New York appellate courts.46 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Mr. Justice Douglas, with Justices Black and Clark dissenting, re-
versed and held that the dispute should go to arbitration. 
The Court held that, whether the dispute was jurisdictional or 
representational in nature as between the two unions and the Com-
pany, the availability of recourse to the NLRB did not preclude 
contract arbitration. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied 
upon Smith v. Evening News Association,41 in which it had been 
held that the existence of a remedy under the NLRA for an unfair 
labor practice did not bar individual employees from seeking dam-
ages for breach of a duplicative provision in a collective bargaining 
agreement. The opinion states: "We think the same policy consid-
erations are applicable here . . . ."48 Precisely what those policy 
considerations are was not indicated either in Carey or in the 
opinion of Mr. Justice White in the Smith case. However, in the 
latter, reference was in turn made to Local 174, Teamsters Union v. 
Lucas Flour Co.,49 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,50 and Sinclair 
II, so presumably the policy considerations underlying those deci-
sions were regarded as applicable. 
In Dowd Box and Lucas Flour it had been argued that the 
courts lacked jurisdiction because the protested conduct was argu-
ably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act 
and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. How-
ever, the Court differentiated suits to enforce collective bargaining 
46. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 7, 221 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1961), 
afj'd, 230 N.Y.S.2d 703, 184 N.E.2d 298 (1962). 
47. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
48. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268 (1964). 
49. 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
50. 368 U.S. 502 (1962). 
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agreements, whether brought in state or federal courts, from at-
tempts to invoke state labor law regulating matters arguably within 
the jurisdiction of the NLRB. With respect to the latter the Court 
has applied broad pre-emption principles.51 The opinion noted that 
"Congress expressly rejected that policy [pre-emption] with respect 
to violations of collective bargaining agreements by rejecting the 
proposal that such violations be made unfair labor practices" and 
"instead, . . . deliberately chose to leave the enforcement of col-
lective bargaining agreements 'to the usual processes of law.' "52 
Underlying Dowd Box, however, was the hypothesis that, in a suit, 
whether in a state or federal court, to enforce a collective bargain-
ing agreement over which a federal court would have jurisdiction 
under section 301, federal rather than state law must apply. Thus, 
the decision in Carey was simply an extension of the view that pre-
emption is inapplicable in the enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreements, regardless of whether the forum is a court or an ar-
bitrator. 
This result seems appropriate in the light of the earlier decisions 
to which the Court referred. Moreover, the rationale of the decision 
implies that as a matter of federal law an arbitrator not only may, 
but must, assume jurisdiction, despite a claim of concurrent NLRB 
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the arbitrator would be depriving a party 
to the agreement of a remedy for which he has contracted. Logically 
this would be true even when the NLRB has previously assumed 
jurisdiction and decided the unfair labor practice issue. If the two 
decisions should, perchance, place the employer or the union in an 
incompatible position, the situation would be one to which the fol-
lowing observation in Smith would be applicable: "If, as respondent 
strongly urges, there are situations in which serious problems will 
arise from both the courts and Board having jurisdiction over acts 
which amount to an unfair labor practice, we shall face those cases 
when they arise."58 It would scarcely be surprising, however, to find 
51. Some of the more important pre-emption cases are San Diego Bldg. Trades 
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 
1 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 
538 (1945). See generally Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. 
L. REv. 211 (1950); Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 
1297 (1954); McCoid, State Regulation of Labor Management Relations, 48 IowA L. 
REv. 578 (1963); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over 
Labor Relations, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 6 (1959); Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State 
Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 46 MICH. L. REv. 593 (1948); Note, Procedural 
Problems of Policing Pre-emption, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 78 (1963). 
52. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962).• 
53. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962). In the following two 
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courts refusing to order arbitration, and arbitrators refusing to 
proceed, where an issue, although submitted under the contract, 
has already been resolved by the NLRB. Both court and arbitrator 
might be expected to inquire, at least, whether the assumption of 
arbitral jurisdiction would either be an exercise in redundancy or 
futility. 
A second arbitrability issue in Carey arose out of the fact that 
"only one of the two unions involved in the controversy has moved 
the state courts to compel arbitration."54 Therefore, as the Court 
further stated, "unless the other union intervenes, an adjudication 
of the arbiter might not put an end to the dispute.''55 The Court 
thus recognized that the non-participating union would not be bound 
by the results of the arbitral decision, but was not particularly 
troubled by this problem since, if the decision of the arbitrator 
were against the participating union, as it might well be, it would 
not adversely affect the non-participating union and might, "as a 
practical matter, end the controversy.''56 
We wonder just how seriously to take the Court's disposition of 
this facet of the case. The ·writ of certiorari was limited to the 
following question: "Whether a state court is pre-empted of its 
jurisdiction to enforce arbitration provisions of a collective bargain-
ing agreement by compelling arbitration of a grievance alleging 
that the employer violated the agreement by assigning work covered 
by the agreement to employees outside the collective bargaining 
unit and refusing to apply the terms and provisions of the agree-
ment to the performance of such work.''57 Accordingly, the question 
cases the court was confronted with a situation in which the NLRB had previously 
assumed jurisdiction: Application of Buchholz, 15 App. Div. 2d 394, 224 N.Y.S.2d 
638 (1962); International Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 332 F.2d 485 
(2d Cir. 1964). In the Buchholz case the court held that arbitration of an employee's 
discharge was barred where the union had previously filed unfair labor practice 
charges. The NLRB had ruled that the discharge was lawful, and its ruling had been 
upheld on appeal. In the General Electric case a NLRB adjudication of a § 8(b)(4)(D) 
violation and the issuance of a cease-and-desist order did not bar arbitration con-
cerning subcontracting. Professor Sovern agrees that courts must assume jurisdiction; 
otherwise § 301 would be "emasculated." However, he believes that the pre-emption 
cases should not be totally irrelevant and that NLRB jurisdiction should be available 
in cases where judicial enforcement is inappropriate. According to Professor Sovern, 
"the courts should in any event retain their discretionary power to delay decision 
when, for example, a controlling Board determination appears imminent." Sovern, 
Section !JOI and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529, 553 
(1963). 
54. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265 (1964). 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 372 U.S. 957 (1963). 
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whether the grievance should -be held non-arbitrable because the 
Federation was not a party to the arbitration proceeding was not 
actually an issue presented for decision, although it was argued.68 
Nevertheless, the Court specifically recognized the problem and 
seemed to feel that a judicial hands-off policy was appropriate. 119 
So reading the decision, it appears to establish a federal rule of 
substantive law that there is no lack of arbitral jurisdiction merely 
because the proceeding and award might adversely affect a non-
participant. (Of course, the proceeding must not involve a lack of 
due process in other respects.) This is a repudiation of the contrary 
view which had been taken by the California Supreme Court in Local 
770, Retail Clerks v. Thriftimart, lnc.60 We think the Court's posi-
tion here is sound despite the obvious problems presented, since in 
similar cases arbitrators have traditionally exercised jurisdiction 
and the arbitration decision may have the therapeutic value 
which, in the Court's view, is one of the virtues of the arbitration 
58. See Brief for Respondent, p. 37, Reply Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14, 15, Brief 
for United States of America as Amicus Curiae, pp. 18-20, Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). 
59. The court took this position in an earlier case in which the National Railroad 
Adjustment Board was the arbitral tribunal under the Railway Labor Act. In White• 
house v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 366 (1955), the Board notified a railroad and one 
of two unions engaged in a jurisdictional dispute that it had assumed jurisdiction. 
Prior to a decision by the Board, the railroad filed an action alleging that the Board's 
failure to give notice to both unions violated the Railway Labor Act and that the 
absent union could later prosecute its own claim. The Supreme Court upheld 
Board jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: 
"The Board has jurisdiction over the only necessary parties to the proceeding 
and over the subject matter. If failure to give notice be treated as an error, in 
an award in favor of Railroad it would constitute at best harmless error which 
could not be made the basis of challenge by Railroad, Telegraphers or Clerks. 
Railroad's resort to the courts has preceded any award, and one may be rendered 
which could occasion no possible injury to it. The inevitable result is to disrupt 
the proceedings of the Board. Its decision has already been delayed for more than 
two years." Id. at 373. 
60. 59 Cal. 2d 421, 380 P.2d 652 (1963). In this case, the issue submitted to arbitra-
tion was whether a collective bargaining agreement applied to the employees of a 
newly acquired subsidiary. Although the subsidiary was never a party to the arbitration 
proceeding, the arbitrator found the collective bargaining agreement to be applicable 
to the subsidiary's stores. The California Supreme Court found that the subsidiary 
would be materially affected by the arbitrator's award and that failure to serve 
notice on the subsidiary was a denial of due process. Emphasizing the consensual 
nature of arbitration, Justice Traynor said: 
" •.. MORE was not a party to the collective bargaining contract and did not join 
in the submission of the controversy to the arbitrator. Thus, the crucial issue 
is whether there can be a valid arbitration award in the absence of a :party 
directly affected by the award. The substantive federal law of collective bargaining 
agreements affords no solution to this question. 'Until it is elaborated by the 
federal courts we assume it does not differ significantly from our own law.' 
(Mccarroll v. Los Angeles County, etc. Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 60, 315 P.2d 
322)." Id. at 426, 380 P.2d at 655. 
For a discussion of the Thriftmart case, see Jones, Autobiography of a Decision, 10 
U.C.L.A.L. RFv. 987, 1004 (1963). 
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process. Moreover, as in the case of the arbitrability issue involving 
concurrent NLRB jurisdiction, we read the Court's opinion in 
Carey as meaning that as a matter of federal law an arbitrator may 
not refuse to assume jurisdiction simply because of non-participation 
of an interested third party, since the parties to the particular con-
tract under which he serves have bargained for the arbitral remedy. 
In reaching this conclusion we apparently are in disagreement 
with Professor Edgar Jones, who implies in a recent provocative 
discussion that despite Carey an arbitrator probably remains free 
to reject jurisdiction in such a case.61 He appears to rely on the later 
Wiley decision in which (as noted below) it was held that strictly 
procedural matters are usually for the arbitrator. But the procedural 
matter involved in Wiley was an alleged lack of compliance with 
the specified steps of the contract grievance procedure. This is a 
quite different kind of procedural matter from that involved in 
Carey. The Court's rationale in Wiley was that the procedural ques-
tions were intertwined with the merits of the dispute and thus 
within the province of the arbitrator to decide. We see the non-party 
issue in Carey as raising a much more fundamental question of the 
propriety of assuming jurisdiction when the award may be un-
enforceable against a non-participating union whose interests are 
affected. Involved in this kind of jurisdictional issue is not an inter-
pretation or application of any part of the labor agreement. In-
volved, instead, is the question-essentially one of federal law and 
policy-whether the arbitrator may or must decline to proceed 
because of the non-participant's interest. The rule, we gather, is 
that jurisdiction exists to proceed bilaterally, even though the 
award may be unenforceable against the non-participant. Since 
this affects the basic authority of the arbitrator to act, we are unable 
to perceive on what theory he could properly refuse to exercise the 
authority granted him by the agreement. 
This aspect of Carey points up one of the weaknesses of the ar-
bitration process. Obviously, an award which may not finally dispose 
of the issues as to all interested and potentially affected persons can 
be an exercise in futility. Ideally, there should be a forum available 
61. Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilemma, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REY. 327, 
332·36 (1964). Professor Jones ingeniously suggests the device of compulsory "trilateral" 
arbitration as an appropriate solution to the problems inherent in this kind of case. 
See Jones, supra; Jones, supra note 60; and Jones, Power and Prudence in the 
Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 11 U.C.L.A.L. RE.v. 675, 772·75 (1964). For a criticism 
of the suggested approach, see Bernstein, Nudging and Shoving All Parties to a Juris-
dictional Dispute Into Arbitration: The Dubious Procedure of NATIONAL STEEL, 78 
HARV, L. RE.v. 784 (1965). 
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which has the authority to bind any interested non-participant. 
Professor Jones has suggested that arbitrators, like courts, may 
well be authorized under the principles announced in Lincoln 
Mills to undertake "arbitral innovation," even to the point of using 
"arbitral interpleader" in a case like Carey. 62 He recognizes, how-
ever, the consensual and practical problems that would be presented 
if the "impleaded" non-participant refused to consent to being a 
participant. He therefore suggests that, at least until the authority 
of an arbitrator to proceed in this fashion becomes established by 
judicial edict (presumably as part of the emerging federal law), the 
arbitrator should proceed with "trilateral" arbitration (after deter-
mining that this is appropriate) over the protest of any interested 
party only if, in a suit brought under section 301, the court approves 
the use of this device. It may be that this is one area in which some 
legislative solution will ultimately be necessary. 
B. The Needham Case 
The question in Needham was whether, if, as alleged, a strike 
protesting the discharge of an employee violated a no-strike pro-
vision, the employer was relieved of the obligation to arbitrate 
grievances subsequently filed by the union protesting both the 
earlier discharge and the discharge of employees involved in the 
strike. The employer had refused to recognize the grievances on 
the ground that by striking the union had "repudiated and ter-
minated the labor agreement." Suit was thereupon instituted in an 
Iowa court to compel arbitration. That court held "the Union had 
waived its right to arbitrate the grievances filed by its walkout," 
and this holding was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court.63 On 
certiorari, this decision was unanimously reversed in an opinion by 
Mr. Justice Harlan. He stated: "The law which controls tl1e dis-
position of this case is stated in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, 
American Bakery & Confectionery Workers International, AFL-CIO, 
370 U.S. 254."64 Since this was the basis of the decision, it added 
nothing to the federal law of arbitrability on the issue here involved 
that was not developed earlier in Sinclair II and Drake Bakeries. 
C. The Wiley Case 
Wiley was another case in which the Union sought to compel 
arbitration through a suit under section 301. Again the decision of 
62. Jones, supra note 61; Jones, supra note 60. 
63. Local 721, United Packinghouse Food Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 254 
Iowa 882, 119 N.W.2d 141 (1963). 
64. Local 721, United Packinghouse Food Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 
U.S. 247, 250 (1964). 
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the Supreme Court was unanimous, although Mr. Justice Goldberg 
did not participate. In the opinion written by Mr. Justice Harlan 
it is stated that "the major questions presented are (1) whether a 
corporate employer must arbitrate with a union under a bargain-
ing agreement between the union and another corporation which 
has merged with the employer, and, if so, (2) whether the court or 
the arbitrator is the appropriate body to decide whether procedural 
prerequisites which, under the bargaining agreement, condition 
the duty to arbitrate have been met.''65 The Second Circuit, re-
versing the district court, had held that an order compelling ar-
bitration should be issued.66 This decision was affirmed. 
It was held, correctly in our judgment, that the question whether 
the arbitration provisions of the agreement survived the corporate 
merger was for a court to decide, when submitted to that forum, and 
that under the circumstances the obligation had survived. The 
question of so-called "procedural arbitrability" was whether the 
district court should have referred to the arbitrator the effect of an 
alleged failure to file a timely grievance. It was held that this was 
a matter to be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. The Court 
stated: 
"Once it is determined, as we have, that the parties are 
obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitra-
tion, 'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and 
bear its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator. Even 
under a contrary rule, a court could deny arbitration only if it 
could confidently be said not only that a claim was strictly 
'procedural,' and therefore within the purview of the court, 
but also that it should operate to bar arbitration altogether, 
and not merely limit or qualify an arbitral award. In view of the 
policies favoring arbitration and the parties' adoption of arbi-
tration as a preferred means of settling disputes, such cases are 
likely to be rare indeed. In all other cases, those in which arbi-
tration goes forward, the arbitrator would ordinarily remain 
free to reconsider the ground covered by the court insofar as 
it bore on the merits of the dispute, using the flexible ap-
proaches familiar to arbitration. Reservation of 'procedural' 
issues for the courts would thus not only create the difficult 
task of separating related issues, but would also produce fre-
quent duplication of effort.''67 
In essence, the basis of the decision on this issue was that the 
65. John Wiley &: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 544 (1964). 
66. Livingston v. John Wiley &: Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963). 
67. 376 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1964). (Emphasis added.) 
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"procedural disagreements," to use the Court's term, were aspects 
of the merits of the dispute and that such matters should usually be 
decided by arbitrators, not courts. But, despite the broad language 
employed, it is not clear that the Court will give the arbitrator full 
discretion to determine whether to dismiss a grievance because of 
some alleged purely procedural defect in the presentation or process-
ing of the complaint. The doubt arises from the italicized portion 
of the excerpt quoted above and from the fact that the Union's 
failure to follow strictly the procedural requirements of the agree-
ment may have been caused by the uncertainty which existed with 
respect to the survival of the agreement. Possibly a different con-
clusion as to the role of the courts would be reached where, for ex-
ample, the arbitration clause states explicitly that an arbitrator has 
no jurisdiction over a grievance which has not been processed in 
the manner provided by the contract, especially if there is no ques-
tion as to the applicability of the agreement. 
D. The American Oil Company Case 
In Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Company, 
another subcontracting case, the district court held that the em-
ployer was required to arbitrate a grievance protesting the contract-
ing out of certain maintenance work, although, as in Warrior & 
Gulf, the labor agreement did not deal explicitly with subcontract-
ing. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the grounds (1) that the 
grievance was not arbitrable despite the 1960 Trilogy cases, and 
(2) that the Union was "barred by collateral estoppel" from seeking 
a decree compelling arbitration.68 The latter holding was based 
upon the fact that in an earlier case between the same parties in-
volving the same type of dispute and the same arbitration provisions 
(although contained in an earlier agreement) a decision against 
arbitrability had been rendered and had not been appealed. 69 On 
certiorari, the decision was affirmed per curiam by an equally 
divided Court, Mr. Justice Goldberg not participating.70 
One problem in appraising this decision arises out of the fact 
that American Oil is factually distinguishable from Warrior & Gulf 
and the other 1960 cases in the type of arbitration clauses involved. 
68. Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 324 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 
1964). 
69. Independent Petroleum Workers v. Standard Oil Co., 275 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 
1960). 
70. Independent Petroleum Workers v. American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 130 (1964). 
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The arbitration provisions before the Court in the 1960 cases were 
very broad, and in Warrior &- Gulf the provision was limited only 
by a general restriction that "matters . . . strictly a function of 
management" were not subject to arbitration. In American Oil, on 
the other hand, the arbitration provisions were structured in an 
entirely different way. In some respects they were broader than 
those before the Court in 1960, since not only questions "involving 
or arising from applications, interpretations or alleged violations 
of the terms of this agreement," but also questions of applications 
or interpretations of or alleged non-compliance with "past policies, 
practices, customs or usages relative to working conditions" were 
declared arbitrable.71 In one respect, however, the arbitration clause 
was arguably more restrictive than those involved in the 1960 cases: 
it contained a provision to the effect that the Company would bar-
gain with the Union with respect to matters "which are not covered 
in this Agreement" but "either party shall have the right to refuse 
to arbitrate any such matter"; in the event of such refusal, the no-
strike obligation was suspended as to that matter.72 The Seventh 
Circuit did not base its decision on the arbitrability issue squarely 
71. Section IO of the agreement provided in part as follows: 
"A. Questions which may be referred to arbitration shall be limited to: 
I. Questions directly involving or arising from applications, interpretations 
or alleged violations of the terms of this agreement. 
2. Questions directly involving or arising from applications, interpretations 
or alleged violations of the terms of arbitration awards and written 
agreements not incorporated in this agreement. 
3. Questions of applications or interpretations of or alleged non-compliance 
with past policies, practices, customs or usages relative to working 
conditions, and grievances arising from: 
(a) the modification by the Company of any of said policies, practices, 
customs and usages, or 
(b) the discontinuance by the Company of any of said policies, practices, 
customs and usages, or 
(c) the establishment by the Company of new policies, practices, customs 
or usages during the term of this Agreement." 275 F.2d 706, 707. , 
In the first case the Union relied on § IOA3 of the agreement in support of its 
claim that the grievances were arbitrable. There was evidence in the record that 
the past practice had been to use both bargaining unit employees and outside con-
tractors in the performance of maintenance work at the Company's Whiting Refinery. 
There was also evidence the Union had sought unsuccessfully in two separate contract 
negotiations to obtain inclusion in the agreement of specific restriction on subcon-
tracting. 
72. This was § 10D, which provided: "The Company will bargain with the 
Union with respect to matters relating to rates of pay, hours of employment, and 
other conditions of employment, which are not covered in this Agreement, or in any 
side agreement or arbitration award, but each party shall have the right to refuse 
to arbitrate any such matter. In the event either party does so refuse, the no-strike 
clause contained in Section 2 of Article XIII of this Agreement shall be suspended 
but solely with respect to the issue concerning which either party shall have so 
refused to arbitrate." 324 F.2d 903, 905. 
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on this provision, but it did seem to regard it as significant.73 We 
doubt that this provision, or any of the others cited, or any of the 
background facts of the case, provide a proper basis for distinguish-
ing American Oil from the 1960 cases. But the possibility exists that 
one or more of the Justices took a different view. It is also possible, 
of course, that one or more of the Justices who voted for affirmance 
are in disagreement with the 1960 decisions, or at least with the 
broad interpretations given to them. 
Another difficulty in attempting to determine the importance of 
American Oil in relation to the law concerning arbitrability issues 
is that the Court evidently had before it both the arbitrability and 
the collateral estoppel questions. It is possible that one or more 
of the affirming Justices thought the estoppel matter dispositive, 
despite the Union's contention that the doctrine was inapplicable, 
because the intervening decisions in the 1960 Trilogy clearly 
indicated that the lower courts in the earlier proceeding between 
the parties had applied an incorrect rule of law. 
These speculative possibilities obviously leave American Oil 
in an enigmatic position in the stream of Supreme Court cases bear-
ing on arbitrability questions. The "elucidating process" of further 
litigation at the Supreme Court level will be necessary to clarify the 
current thinking of the members of the Court, particularly since 
shortly after the per curiam decision in American Oil, certiorari 
was denied in a subcontracting case which the Second Circuit, 
relying on the 1960 Trilogy, had decided in favor of arbitrability.74 
Petitioners had argued that a conflict existed between decisions of 
the Second and Seventh Circuits. It should be noted, however, that 
the contract provisions involved in the case for which certiorari 
was sought again were different from those in American Oil, so it is 
conceivable that a majority of the Court rejected the claim of con-
73. The principal ground of decision appeared to be a square rejection of the 
Union's claim that § IOAI made the grievance arbitrable. The basis of the claim 
of alleged contract violation was evidently the doctrine of implied limitations 
arising out of provisions such as the recognition clause. The court rejected this 
approach; in so doing it obviously passed on the merits of the Union's contractual 
theory. Thus it seems clear to us that its actions were inconsistent with the require-
ments of the 1960 Trilogy. But the decision may be explainable, in part, as resting 
on § IOD of the contract. The court said defendant's position on this provision 
excluding subcontracting from the arbitration had "plausibility," but it saw no need 
to resolve the question posed. However, it added: "The section is significant because 
the parties agreed that certain disputes were not subject to compulsory arbitration, 
which destroys plaintiff's theory that the mere allegation of contract violation requires 
arbitration." 324 F.2d 902, 907. 
74. International Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 332 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964). 
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flict. But another possibility is that the Court is standing by the 
1960 Trilogy and that the vote in American Oil is not to be inter-
preted otherwise. Until the contrary is shown, we see no reason to 
modify our views as expressed above concerning the meaning of the 
1960 cases, although, as we shall note, there is room for the view 
that the Court will not relegate to arbitrators the final interpretation 
of those arbitration clauses the Court deems to be clearly restrictive 
or even ambiguous. 
E. The Kimball Company Case 
Piano & Musical Instrument Workers Union v. W. W. Kimball 
Co. was another per curiam decision rendered in December 1964, 
again with respect to a Seventh Circuit decision. But this time a 
different kind of substantive issue was involved. A labor agreement 
between Kimball Company and the Union covered operations at 
the Company's Melrose Park, Illinois, plant. During its term, the 
Company notified the Union that it was discontinuing operations 
at Melrose Park "immediately." Two days later operations there 
were discontinued and employees were laid off. Thereafter, opera-
tions were transferred to a plant at French Lick, Indiana, and hiring 
began at that plant eight days after the Melrose Park agreement 
expired. The Union insisted that laid-off employees had seniority 
rights of recall exercisable at the French Lick plant by virtue of 
the Melrose Park agreement. It relied particularly on the portion 
of the agreement granting recall rights for a period of two years 
following a layoff. After extended discussions between Company 
and Union representatives, during which the Company offered to 
grant severance pay to the laid-off employees and evidently indicated 
its willingness to employ those who were willing to submit applica-
tions for employment at French Lick (both rejected by the Union 
as inconsistent ·with employees' total rights under the expired agree-
ment), the Union proposed arbitration. When the Company refused, 
the Union brought suit to compel arbitration under a broad, 
standard type arbitration clause contained in the expired agreement. 
The Company's defense on the ground that the agreement had ex-
pired was rejected by the district court, which ruled that the ques-
tion of arbitrability was for the arbitrator. The Court relied princi-
pally upon the Supreme Court's decision in Wiley. A reversal by 
the court of appeals on the ground that Wiley was distinguishable 
and not determinative was in turn unanimously reversed by the 
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Supreme Court, which merely cited American Manufacturing and 
Wiley. 
This decision is of little value in our attempt to interpret the 
developing federal law of arbitrability, since the two cases cited 
involved significantly different kinds of issues. Had the Court cited 
Enterprise along with American Manufacturing, this would have 
indicated the Court considered that a claim of contract violation 
had been made by the Union and that such claim was for the 
arbitrator even though the agreement had expired since an issue 
of interpretation was involved. The citation of Wiley is confusing 
because the basic arbitrability issue there involved (the question 
whether rights under a labor agreement survived a corporate merger) 
was, in fact, decided by the Court itself. 
IV. ISSUES INVOLVING ARBITRAL JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY: 
A CATEGORIZATION 
It remains now to attempt to assess broadly the significance 
of the Supreme Court decisions reviewed above in delineating the 
respective roles of the judges and arbitrators and in determining 
the applicable federal rule of law where questions of arbitral juris-
diction or authority are raised before a court or arbitrator either 
before or after75 arbitration. It will aid analysis to attempt to classify 
such questions, since we believe the decisions indicate that the result 
in a given case may depend upon the category into which it falls. 
Without purporting to cover all the kinds of claims of lack of 
arbitral jurisdiction or authority which can be made, we suggest 
they include at least the following: 
Claim (1). There exists no contractually binding or enforceable 
agreement to arbitrate any issue. 
Claim (2): Some provision of the labor agreement specifically 
excludes the subject matter of the grievance from the arbitra-
tion process. 
Claim (3). The subject matter of the grievance has been ex-
cluded from the arbitration process by virtue of some special 
(collateral) agreement, express or implied (e.g., from collective 
bargaining history or past practice). 
Claim (4). The subject matter of the grievance is excluded from 
the arbitration process by virtue of certain general contractual 
75. A party losing in an arbitration proceeding may obtain judicial review either 
by petitioning the court to vacate the arbitrator's award, if a statute provides for 
this procedure, or by refusing to comply with the award and then defending an ' 
enforcement action brought by the winning party. 
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restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator (e.g., a pro-
vision that there shall be no jurisdiction of a grievance resting 
on an alleged past practice or on an alleged implied obligation). 
Claim (5). The subject matter of the grievance is not arbitra-
ble because the labor agreement contains no substantive com-
mitment whatsover, express or implied, of the kind which must 
be found to exist in order to sustain the grievance. 
Claim (6). The subject matter of the grievance is not arbitrable 
because the parties have recognized in the labor agreement or 
by virtue of some special (collateral) agreement express or im-
plied (e.g., from collective bargaining history or past practice) 
the right of the respondent party to perform the act complained 
of. 
Claim (7). The arbitrator lacks jurisdiction because of the fail-
ure of the grievant to comply with a requirement of the griev-
ance or arbitration procedure. 
Claim (8). The arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to render a valid 
award because of the absence from the proceeding (and the lack 
of power in the arbitrator to require the participation of, or to 
bind) a person, including another union, not party to the labor 
agreement under which the arbitrator is appointed, but whose 
interests are involved. 
Claim (9). The arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to render a valid 
award because of the refusal of the other contracting party to 
participate in the proceeding. 
Claim (10). The arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to render a valid 
award because of the absence from the proceeding of an em-
ployee subject to the labor agreement whose interests are ad-
verse to the position taken by the grievant. 
Claim (11). The arbitrator lacks jurisdiction of the grievance 
because the subject matter falls within the province of some 
other tribunal (e.g., the National Labor Relations Board). 
Claim (12). The award is totally or partially invalid because 
the arbitrator, although he had jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the grievance, exceeded some contractual or legal 
limitations on his authority. 
The question is to what extent any of these kinds of attacks on 
arbitral jurisdiction or authority can or should be successful as a 
matter of federal law. On some of these issues the Supreme Court 
has provided fairly clear answers. As to some others, although the 
Court has not directly spoken, the decisions which have been handed 
down and their underlying rationale provide bases for drawing 
plausible conclusions. As to still other issues, the answers remain 
largely conjectural. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the kinds of issues listed, it 
782 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:751 
is worth recalling that in a strict sense, as the Court has repeatedly 
stated, the existence and scope of an alleged agreement to arbitrate, 
if not specifically submitted for arbitral decision, are matters for 
judicial determination if appropriately raised before a court. In 
theory, then, any of the listed categories which raise an issue of this 
kind are "for the court." One problem, however, arises out of the 
fact that, while any of these kinds of claims is justiciable as a matter 
of theory, the Court has clearly indicated that some, at least, should 
not be the basis for intercepting the arbitration process, or, in our 
view of the cases, for invalidating an award; thus, the practical effect 
is that such claims are not jurisdictional. It is important to deter-
mine which categories of claims fall in this area. Another problem 
arises out of the fact that some of the kinds of claims listed above do 
not involve the question of the existence or scope of the agreement 
to arbitrate, but raise other questions of arbitral jurisdiction or 
authority. 
Consequently, the categories listed above may in turn be re-
grouped as follows: (A) those going to questions of arbitral jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the grievance or over the particular 
grievance [claims (I) to (7), inclusive, and claim (11)]; (B) those 
questions of jurisdiction involving the absence of an affected per-
son [ claims (8) to (10), inclusive]; (C) those raising the question 
whether the arbitral award is def~ctive or unenforceable because of 
contractual or legal limitations on the arbitrator's authority [claim 
(12)]. We shall use this regrouping in the analysis that follows. 
A. Issues Involving Question of Arbitral Jurisdiction Over 
the Subject Matter or Over the Particular Grievance 
I. Issue Clearly for Judicial Determination-Claim (1) 
We think only claim (I) of those listed above may be included 
with assurance under this caption. Here arbitral jurisdiction is 
challenged on the ground that there exists between the parties no 
contractually binding or enforceable agreement to arbitrate any 
issue (and it is assumed there has been no specific grant to the 
arbitrator of the authority to resolve the question of the existence 
of such agreement). Encompassed are a variety of contractual issues, 
including the assertions: (a) that the labor agreement (or, indeed, 
the special submission, if there was one) lacked contractual validity 
at its inception;76 (b) that the labor or submission agreement, al-
76. See, e.g., Genesco, Inc. v. Joint Council 13, United Shoe Workers, 230 F. 
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though once valid and existing, has expired;77 (c) that the arbitra-
tion obligation contained in the agreement is unenforceable, as a 
matter of law, because of a breach of obligation (typically the no-
strike clause) by the party seeking to arbitrate;78 and (d) that the 
agreement was made by a predecessor in interest and is not binding 
upon the successor, who is opposing arbitration.79 
In Wiley, one question raised was whether the arbitral and other 
commitments made in a labor agreement survived a corporate 
merger. The decision was categorical: "Both parties urge that this 
question is for the courts. Past cases leave no doubt that this is cor-
rect."80 Cited in support of this statement were Sinclair II and War-
rior & Gulf. It seems clear that the Court properly invoked the basic 
postulate of Warrior & Gulf and other cases, remarking: "The duty 
to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to 
arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collec-
Supp. 92!! (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (condition precedent to contract formation held not 
fulfilled); In Te Davis, 57 L.R.R.M. 2142 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (authority to execute 
contract held lacking); Litzenberger v. Remington Rand, 5!l L.R.R.M. 2052 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 196!!) (informal memoranda held not to have contractual force); cf. Schoenholtz 
v. Benley Lingerie, Inc., 49 CCH Lab. Cas. 1J 5III4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (failure to 
sign agreement held waived by participating in arbitration). See also Restaurant 
Leagues v. Townsend, 57 L.R.R.M. 21!!5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), in which the question 
presented was whether an arbitration agreement between a union and an employers' 
association was binding upon a member of the association. 
77. See, e.g., Minnesota Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. United 
Garment Mfg. Co., !l!lB F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1964) (arbitration clause enforced after 
contract expired for breach occurring during its term); Procter &: Gamble Independent 
Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962), ceTt. denied, 374 
U.S. B!lO (1962) (grievances based upon conditions arising after contract has expired 
held not arbitrable); Worcester Stamped Metal Co. v. United Steelworkers, 234 F. Supp. 
82!! (D. Mass. 1964) (grievance involving vacation pay held arbitrable although contract 
had expired when grievance arose); Austin Mailers Union v. Newspapers, Inc., 226 
F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Tex. 196!!), afj'd, 329 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 377 
U.S. 985 (1964) (dispute on wage scales held not arbitrable under contract which had 
expired before union demand arbitration). 
78. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. United Garment Mfg. Co., 3!!8 
F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1964); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Kennecott Copper 
Corp., !!38 F.2d 224 (10th Cir. 1964); United Mine Workers v. Roncco, 232 F. Supp. 
865 (D. Wyo. 1964); Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Trailways of New England, 
Inc., 232 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1964). 
79. For two recent cases which relied upon Wiley in concluding that a successor 
employer must arbitrate grievances arising under a prior contract, see United 
Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 3!!5 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964), and Wackenhut 
Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 
1964). In the former case, the court seems to limit the possible scope of arbitration by 
stating that "in the arbitration of any grievance asserted thereunder, the arbitrator 
may properly give weight to any change of circumstances created by the transfer of 
ownership which may make adherence to any term or terms of that agreement 
inequitable." !!35 F.2d 891, 895. 
80. 376 U.S. 54!!, 546 (1964). 
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tive bargaining agreement does in fact create such a duty. Thus, 
just as an employer has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it 
has not agreed to arbitrate, so, a fortiori, it cannot be compelled to 
arbitrate if an arbitration clause does not bind it at all."81 
Wiley was very different from Warrior & Gulf, we submit, 
despite the Court's apparent equation of the two. While no person 
can be compelled to arbitrate except by judicial decree, the 1960 
Trilogy instructed the courts to refrain from interrupting the arbi-
tration process in cases such as those decided, and, in effect, deter-
mined that arbitrability issues of the kinds there raised, as well as 
the issues going to the merits, should be resolved by the arbitrator. 
In Wiley, on the other hand, the Court took the position that a 
challenge to the contractual validity or applicability of an alleged 
obligation to arbitrate is to be independently determined by the 
court when raised in a judicial proceeding. In Drake Bakeries (of 
the 1962 Trilogy) and Needham (of the 1964 cases) we think the 
same position was taken with respect to the question of whether 
breach of an obligation by one party to a labor agreement has the 
legal effect of suspending the obligation of the other party to 
arbitrate. 
2. Issues Clearly for Arbitral Determination Under a Standard 
Arbitration Clause-Claims (5) and (6) 
We include under this caption those types of claims which, as 
we understand the Supreme Court's position, should not be held to 
justify judicial interception of the arbitration process for want of 
alleged jurisdiction in the arbitrator and which, if decided either 
way by the arbitrator, should not be a basis for refusing to enforce 
the arbitral decision. By "standard arbitration clause" we mean a 
provision that any dispute "involving the interpretation or applica-
tion of this agreement,'' processed as a grievance under the agree-
ment, may be submitted to arbitration under specified procedures. 
Under this caption we would include claims (5) and (6). 
These claims essentially constitute challenges to jurisdiction on 
the ground that the labor agreement contains no substantive com-
mitment of a kind that must exist in order for the claim to be 
sustained or that there is evidence that the parties have agreed that 
the charged party has the contractual right to perform the disputed 
act. Where, as in claim (5), the assertion is that the labor agreement, 
81. Id. at 547. 
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properly interpreted, contains no express or implied commitment 
of the kind which must be found in order to sustain the grievance, 
we have the traditional challenge to arbitral jurisdiction on the basis 
of which the Cutler-Hammer and like judicial approaches were 
developed prior to the 1960 Trilogy. It is the teaching of the 
Trilogy that, so far as federal law is concerned, a court must in this 
kind of case allow the matter to proceed through the arbitration 
process82 and must thereafter uphold the arbitrator's determination, 
since intertwined with the so-called jurisdictional issue is necessarily 
an examination of the merits of the grievance under the labor agree-
ment itself. In American Manufacturing, the case most directly in 
point, the Court stated: 
"The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits 
of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a par-
ticular claim, or determining whether there is particular 
language in the written instrument which will support the 
claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, 
not merely those the court will deem meritorious. The process-
ing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values which 
those who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite 
unaware."88 
This is a very broad statement, indeed. We take it to mean that 
however generalized, absurd, ridiculous, or preposterous the griev-
ance may appear to be, the issues of arbitrability and merits are to 
go to arbitration and the arbitrator may make a final determination 
of such issues. 84 Certainly it is clear that he may dispose of the 
82. See, e.g., Local 702, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 
!124 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1963) (discontinuance of employee gas discount held arbitrable, 
although subject not included in contract); Newspaper Guild v. Tonawanda Publishing 
Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 211, 245 N.Y.S.2d 832, afj'd, 14 N.Y.2d 631, 249 N.Y.S.2d 178 
(1964) (elimination of Christmas bonus held arbitrable, although subject not included in 
contract). But see Local 30, Philadelphia Leather Workers v. Hyman Brodsky &: Son 
Corp., 49 CCH Lab. Cas. ,i 18987 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (closing of plant and union claim 
for severance pay held not arbitrable under standard arbitration clause where there 
was no provision in the contract covering such matters); Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. 
Local 450, Int'! Union of Elec. Workers, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. ,I 51076 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) 
(subcontracting grievance held not arbitrable since the agreement was silent on the 
subject and negotiations indicated no limitation on company's right to subcontract). 
83. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). 
84. See, e.g., Humble Oil &: Ref. Co. v. Independent Industrial Workers, 337 F.2d 
!121 (5th Cir. 1964) (refusal of the company to allow union representatives to be 
present during interrogation of an employee held arbitrable where the grievance 
was based on certification and union recognition clauses). In International Union 
of Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 922, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), 
the court disposed summarily of the possibility that the grievance presented might 
be frivolous: "In every instance the union has asserted that the acts giving rise to the 
grievance constituted a violation of a contract provision. In some instances this 
complaint seems far-fetched. But whether a violation exists is a question for the 
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merits; and presumably in a case such as this he will deny the 
grievance. But, if he sustained the grievance, there would not be 
reversible error. The only substantial question is whether he has the 
authority to hold the grievance non-arbitrable and on this ground 
to refuse to decide the merits. As previously stated, we think a proper 
interpretation of the 1960 Trilogy is that he has this right.85 What 
the Court was saying, in essence, is that the entire range of issues 
presented is for the arbitrator to decide. It seems clear, moreover, 
that the range of arbitrable issues includes those cases, which are 
legion, where the grievance expressly or otherwise is posited upon 
some obligation alleged to be implicit in some part or the whole 
of the labor agreement. 
Claim (6) is not quite so easy to dispose of as claim (5). Here the 
assertion is that the parties by virtue of past practice or agreement, 
express or implicit, have recognized the right of the party opposing 
arbitration to perform the disputed act.86 An illustrative case would 
be one in which the grievance protests the subcontracting of work 
where the management rights clause of the labor agreement specifi-
cally states: "Management shall have the right to contract out work 
of kinds falling within the scope of the collective bargaining unit."87 
When each of us first separately reviewed the 1960 Trilogy, we 
asserted that this situation should be equated to the case in which 
the arbitration clause specifically excludes a given subject matter 
(here subcontracting) from the arbitration process.88 But we now 
consider this to be an improper interpretation of the cases. The fact 
arbitrator, not for the court. The fact that a claim of violation may seem to the court 
to be frivolous is not a ground for denying the arbitration to which the parties 
have agreed." 
85. See Gregory, Enforcement of Collective Agreements by Arbitration, 48 VA. L, 
REv. 883, 888 (1962), in which the author states: "If the court finds that the issue is 
not unarbitrable, then it should go before an arbitrator, After the arbitrator has 
read the contract, he may still dismiss the grievance as not arbitrable. An arbitrator 
must always pass on arbitrability, when he is asked to do so." See generally Jones, 
supra note 60, at 1002; Smith, Arbitrators and Arbitrability, in LABOR ARBITRATION AND 
INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 75, 90 (1963). For an application of this principle in an arbitral 
decision, see Hughes Tool Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1125, 1129 (Aaron 1960). 
86. See note 92 infra. 
87. Compare the management prerogative provision in Boeing Co. v. UAW, 234 
F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1964), which states: "The Company has the right to subcontract 
and designate the work to be performed by the Company and the places where it is 
to be performed, which right shall not. be subject to arbitration." Designation of 
the functions of management in conjunction with exclusionary language in the 
arbitration clause was held sufficient to preclude arbitration of a plant location dispute. 
88. Jones, The Supreme Court and the Arbitration Process, in ADDRESSES ON INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 121-33 (1961); Smith, The Question of Arbitrability-The Roles of tht 
Arbitrator, the Court, and the Parties, 16 Sw. L.J. 1, 10 (1962). 
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is that the illustrative case, and others like it, are simply instances 
in which the grievance presents an obviously, or apparently ob-
viously, frivolous claim. Accordingly, we can now see no reason to 
distinguish this case from claim (5).89 Both are simply cases in which 
the decision of a court or arbitrator is easily anticipated. The 
Supreme Court has said, in effect, that in such instances the parties 
have elected to use the arbitration process and should be held to 
their choice. These cases like those involving subjects specifically 
excluded by the agreement from the arbitration process. Rather, 
like others apparently more meritorious, they fall within the scope 
of the agreement to arbitrate. 
The fallacy, as we now see it, of the earlier equation of claim (6) 
with claim (2) lay in the assumption, not sufficiently articulated or 
defended, that a clear affirmance in the labor agreement of the right 
to perform the questioned act ought to be regarded as indicating an 
intent to exclude the subject matter from the arbitration process. 
But this begs the question. A dismissal of a grievance for lack of 
arbitral jurisdiction does not have the same legal effect as a denial 
of the grievance on the merits. A ruling against jurisdiction implies 
no judgment at all on the merits; but a ruling denying the grievance 
on the merits is a holding either that the adverse party has not con-
tractually committed himself in any way with respect to the subject 
matter of the grievance or, as in a claim (6) situation, that the party 
has a positive contractual right to perform the disputed act. The 
latter is a binding interpretation of the labor agreement, with what-
ever consequences are entailed. 
This distinction may in some cases be important. For example, 
it may determine whether the moving party (grievant) has or lacks 
89. Two cases recently considered whether a management functions clause should 
be held to exclude a dispute from arbitration. In Local 12298, Dist. 50, UMW v. 
Bridgeport Gas Co., 328 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1964), reversing 222 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 
1963), a management functions clause providing that "the right to relieve employees from 
duty because of lack of work is vested in the Company" was held not to preclude 
arbitration of disputes concerning the existence of job vacancies. The court ruled 
that the posting of vacancies was held to be encompassed within the term "conditions 
of employment" and not unambiguously excluded from arbitration. A similar con-
clusion was reached in General Warehousemen Union v. American Hardware Supply 
Co., 329 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1964). Notwithstanding a provision for severance pay "when, 
in the sole judgment of the Company, it decides to discontinue operation of any 
portion of its wholesale house," the court held that the union was entitled to arbitrate 
employee terminations upon -movement of facilities. In accordance with the 1960 
Trilogy, the court refused "to succumb to the enticing temptation to determine 
at the outset whether the asserted controversy is palpably unfounded on its merits." 
Id. at 792. 
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a right to seek relief with respect to the protested act either by self-
help, such as strike action, or before a court.90 
3. Issues in Doubt-Claims (2), (3), (4), (7), and (11) 
Although the Supreme Court has not as yet spoken definitively 
on these issues, or at least all aspects of them, certain decisions 
afford some guidance. The views here expressed represent our tenta-
tive judgments. 
a. Claims (2) and (3). Claims (2) and (3) may be grouped 
together since in each instance the contention is that the subject 
matter of the grievance has been excluded from the arbitration 
process by agreement. The difference between the two is that in 
claim (2) it is asserted that some specific provision in the labor 
agreement indicates this exclusionary intent,91 whereas in claim (3) 
the argument is that such intent is to be found in a special agree-
ment or in the implications of past practice or collective bargaining 
history.92 
90. Allied Workers Union v. Ethyl Corp., 58 L.R.R.M. 2267 (5th Cir. 1965). 
91. For example, the court in Communication Workers v. New York Tel. Co., !!27 
F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964), considered the following contractual provision dealing with 
promotions: "In selecting employees for promotion to occupational classifications 
within the bargaining unit, seniority shall govern if other necessary qualifications are 
substantially equal. In no event shall any grievance or dispute arising out of this 
Section 9.08 be subject to the arbitration provisions of this Agreement." Denying the 
arbitrability of grievances involving temporary promotions, the court observed, "It is 
difficult to imagine a clearer or more direct exclusionary clause •••• We believe these 
words convey a clear and unambiguous directive that no Section 9.08 disputes of any 
kind are arbitrable." 
92. One type of exclusion by special agreement is illustrated by Boot Workers 
v. Faith Shoe Co., 47 CCH Lab. Cas. ,I 18260 (M.D. Pa. 1963). In this case, sub-
sequent to the initial contract, the parties had entered into an agreement excluding 
a subject from arbitration. The court held that both agreements must be considered 
to determine the arbitrability of a claim. 
A more commonly encountered claim of exclusion rests on the alleged existence 
of collective bargaining history of nonarbitrability of a particular type grievance. 
To indicate the intent of the parties, bargaining history may be presented either 
under claim (3) to prove that the subject was excluded from arbitration or under 
claim (6) to prove that one party (usually the employer) had a right to perform 
the act charged as breach of the contract. It is often difficult to separate these two 
issues in a particular case, since both are common arguments presented in subcon-
tracting and other "management prerogative" cases. Under either claim there has 
been a conflict of authority on the propriety of using bargaining history to defeat 
arbitrability. Courts appear to be more willing to accept evidence of bargaining 
history to exclude a subject from arbitration than to deny arbitration where the 
right to perform an act is claimed as a bar. The following cases have ruled upon the 
question. Under claim (3): Decisions holding bargaining history admissible: Com-
munications Workers v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 337 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1964), 
affirming 310 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1962); Independent Soap Workers v. Procter &: Gamble 
Mfg. Co., 314 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963); United Brick 
Workers v. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co., 232 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Mo. 1964); United 
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With respect at least to claim (2), it could be argued that the 
question of arbitrability is simply one of interpretation of part of 
the arbitration clause, and hence, like any other question of inter-
pretation arising under the labor agreement, should be disposed of 
by judicial abstinence and referral to the arbitration process. Since, 
however, we are dealing here with the interpretation of the arbitral 
jurisdiction language of the agreement, it can more plausibly be 
argued that this approach should be rejected and that an issue of 
this kind is for a court to decide independently if it is raised in a 
judicial proceeding. 
Our analysis of the 1960 Trilogy cases led us to conclude that 
one of the propositions emerging from the decisions was that a 
court should hold a grievance non-arbitrable under a valid agree-
ment to use arbitration as the terminal point in the grievance 
procedure only if the parties have clearly indicated their intention 
to exclude the subject matter of the claim from the arbitration 
process, either by expressly so stating in the arbitration clause or by 
otherwise clearly and unambiguously indicating such intention. 
Our analysis of the 1962 cases noted that the Court in Sinclair II 
independently decided that the grievance there involved (the claim 
that the union had breached its no-strike covenant) was clearly ex-
cluded from the arbitration process. Thus it may be concluded that 
the controlling question for the Court is whether the particular 
labor agreement or some alleged special agreement does clearly ex-
clude the subject matter or the grievance from the arbitration 
process. If the Court has any doubt, it seems likely that the matter 
would be sent to arbitration. But Sinclair II shows that the Court 
can be convinced, in a given case, that there is no doubt. 
Questions of interpretation of exclusionary language contained 
in an arbitration clause or some other provision of a labor agreement 
Elcc. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 208 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Maryland Tel. 
Union v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1960). Decisions 
holding bargaining history inadmissible: A. S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typographical 
Union, 338 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1964); International Union of Elec. Workers v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Under Claim (6): Decision 
holding bargaining history admissible: Independent Petroleum ·workers v. American 
Oil Co., 324 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1964), afj'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 
379 U.S. 130 (1964). Decisions holding bargaining history inadmissible: International 
Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 332 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1964); Ass'n of 
Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Co., 283 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1960); 
Newspaper Guild v. Hammond Publishing Co., 48 L.R.R.M. 2577 (N.D. Ind. 1961); 
Emmett O'Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co., 59 Cal. 2d 482, 381 P.2d 188 (1963). A related 
case, NLRB v. Gulf Atl. Warehouse Co., 291 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1961), held that 
bargaining history should be excluded in determining whether a union could require 
an employer to furnish seniority lists. 
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will not always be easy for the Court. Moreover, in some cases the 
intent and scope of the exclusionary language arguably may call for 
the kind of expertise which, in the 1960 Trilogy cases, the Court 
attributed to the arbitrator.93 It is conceivable, and in our judg-
ment likely, that in any such case the Court, reverting to the ration-
ale underlying the 1960 decisions, will view the matter as involving 
to some extent the basic merits of the grievance and therefore will 
refer it to the arbitrator for decision.94 On the other hand, if the 
93. In one case with which we are familiar the arbitration clause provided that 
"the arbitrator may act only on violations of the terms of this Agreement, and cannot 
determine wages, production standards, or job classifications." A piecework wage 
system was in effect in the plant, and the agreement contained certain provisions 
relating to the system, including the following: "Production standards shall be estab• 
lished on the basis of fairness and equity consistent with the quality of workmanship, 
efficiency of operation, and the reasonable working capacities of normal operators." 
The grievance filed by the Union asserted that the Company had violated the wage 
provisions of the agreement by requiring a piecework operator to rerun on his own 
time (i.e., without additional compensation) salvageable pieces which he had run 
defectively and in charging back against the operator non-salvageable pieces which 
he had run defectively. The Union, moreover, asserted that the grievance was not 
arbitrable and, hence, that it had to be settled through collective bargaining. The 
agreement made strike action available in the case of non-arbitrable grievances. The 
question of arbitrability was whether the determination of a production standard was 
involved; the Company contended no such question was involved, but rather, only 
an application of a long-standing practice. The parties were in agreement, despite 
the provision above-quoted, that the fairness of a production standard was not 
arbitrable (a fact, in itself, somewhat difficult to understand). We submit that in a 
case like this a determination of the arbitrability question is difficult, indeed, and 
probably requires, among other things, an intensive examination of the alleged past 
practice and an understanding of the precise nature and operation of the incentive 
system being used. 
Occasionally the exclusionary provision of the agreement is unique and presents 
unusual and even more difficult problems of analysis and interpretation. For example, 
in another case with which we are familiar the arbitration clause, instead of using 
exclusionary language, stated categories of cases subject to arbitral determination, 
including the following: "(b) the dismissal (except for misconduct) of an employee 
who at the time of dismissal had three (3) or more years of completed net credited 
service." In one discharge case which the Union sought to arbitrate, the question of 
arbitral jurisdiction was presented and sharply contested, The Company conceded 
that employee dismissals for certain kinds of derelictions (e.g., insubordination, inade-
quate work performance, and drinking on the job) were not excluded from arbitral 
review, but contended that a dismissal for any kind of dereliction comprehended by 
the term "misconduct" not only was not arbitral, but that all the Company had to 
show in order to make the matter non-arbitrable was that the dismissal was motivated 
by the good faith belief that the employee had committed the act of misconduct 
charged, proof of the actual commission of such act not being required. The parties 
did agree, however, that at least the meaning of the term "misconduct" was arbitral. 
Again, we submit, the kinds of issues here involved lend themselves peculiarly to the 
arbitration process. 
94. See, e.g., 'Publishers' Ass'n v. New York Mailers' Union, 317 F.2d 624, 625 (2d 
Cir. 1963). In Desert Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. General Sales Drivers Union, 335 F.2d 
198 (9th Cir. 1964), the arbitration provision concluded with the statement: "It is 
understood that the above shall not apply in any way concerning wages." Notwith-
standing this provision, the court held arbitrable a question of whether driver-salesmen 
were entitled to overtime compensation for work in excess of forty hours per week. 
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• exclusionary provision seems perfectly clear to the Court despite 
any argument to the contrary, it will probably make its own inde-
pendent determination of the question of arbitrability.95 
b. Claim (4). Claim (4) is that the subject matter is excluded 
from the arbitration process by virtue of certain general contractual 
restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. We include in 
this category any claim of non-arbitrability which relies on a theory 
other than that the subject matter is specifically excluded from the 
arbitration process by the labor agreement itself or by some special 
agreement, express or implied. Without necessarily attempting a 
complete enumeration, we suggest that this category includes the 
following types of cases: 
(A). Under the arbitration clause of the labor agreement 
the arbitrator's jurisdiction is specifically limited to grievances 
the subject matter of which is dealt with expressly by the labor 
agreement. Illustratively the agreement might state: "In order 
for a grievance to be arbitrable, it must involve and allege 
violation of a provision of this agreement which specifically 
and expressly deals with the subject matter of the grievance."96 
The court reasoned that wages need not be interpreted as commensurate with com• 
pensation, but that it could be given a narrower definition commensurate with "wage 
scale." Thus, since the arbitration clause might be "susceptible of an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute," arbitration was directed. 
95. See Communications Workers v. New York Tel. Co., 327 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 
1964), where the court reviewed the federal policy favoring arbitration and concluded: 
"[I)f the strong presumption in favor of arbitrability established in the Steelworkers 
cases is not to be made irrebuttable, we cannot close our eyes to the plain meaning of 
the words used in this contract .••• We cannot bring ourselves to accept this invita• 
tion to ignore the plain meaning of the ••• exclusionary clause, and to find ambiguity 
where none exists, by indulging ourselves in speculation as to what types of disputes 
a union might be likely to require an employer to settle by arbitration." Likewise, 
the court in Local 787, Int'! Union of Elec. Workers v. Collins Radio Co., 317 F.2d 
214, 219 (5th Cir. 1963), commented: "The exclusionary terms used in the contract 
were emphatic. •.• While the Union had contrived a beguiling theory to make 
this appear to be something other than what it really is, the effect is to allow arbitra• 
tion of a dispute categorically excluded. . •• The parties by the plainest language 
excluded this controversy and all of those growing out of it from the grievance 
machinery. This Court, following the admonitions of the Supreme Court's Trilogy 
opinions, recognizes that the law is committed now to a hospitable application of 
the grievance machinery prescribed by parties to a collective bargaining contract .••• 
But if full rein is to be given to this device as a means thought best able to achieve 
industrial peace, it must be enforced with an even hand. That which the parties have 
committed to the arbiter is for the arbiter alone, not the Court. Courts must assure 
that. But it is equally important to assure that neither party-through one guise or 
another-may obtain the intervention of an arbiter when the contract clearly excludes 
it from the reach of the grievance machinery." 
96. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. UAW, 231 F Supp. 930 (E.D. Pa. 1964), which involved 
a provision limiting arbitration to grievances involving a "specific provision of this 
agreement." The court held that the employer was not obligated to arbitrate a 
dispute concerning its distribution of Christmas turkeys which was not referred to 
in the agreement. 
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(B). The arbitration clause in the labor agreement may or 
may not be limited as in (A) above, but, in addition or inde-
pendently, it excludes from arbitration any grievance which, in 
order to be sustained, must rest upon some contractual obliga-
tion implied from some provision or provisions of the labor 
agreement or must rest upon the alleged binding effect of some 
alleged past practice or agreement not expressed in or part of 
the labor agreement. 
(C). The labor agreement contains a "management rights" 
clause, either in general or specific terms, and provides either (I) 
that "all management rights other than those qualified or sur-
rendered by some specific provision of this agreement are not 
subject to arbitration hereunder," or (2) that "the exercise by 
the Company of any of its exclusive rights shall not be subject 
to arbitration except with respect to a claim that such right 
was exercised in bad faith."97 
(D). The arbitration clause in the labor agreement provides 
that, if in response to a demand to arbitrate a grievance it is 
contended that the subject matter of the grievance is not arbi-
trable, the arbitrator shall be without jurisdiction to proceed 
with the grievance unless (I) the parties specifically stipulate 
that he may decide the arbitrability issue, or (2) the grievance 
is determined to be arbitrable by a court of competent juris-
diction. 
Taking the easiest case first, it is clear that in the last of the cited 
examples the question of arbitrability obviously would be for the 
court in the absence of a special submission to the arbitrator, since, 
however foolishly, the parties have clearly and unambiguously given 
the party opposing arbitration the right to insist upon an ad hoc 
judicial determination of the arbitrability issue.98 The only doubtful 
case, as we see it, might be one in which the court could be 
convinced that the respondent has interposed the arbitrability 
issue in bad faith-i.e., where the objection to arbitrability is 
clearly spurious. 
The other types of examples-(A), (B), and (C) above-seem to 
us to require a different analysis. The critical question is whether 
these kinds of contractual attempts to restrict the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction should be equated with cases where the parties by 
97. Although not directly in point, see Truck Drivers v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 
562 (8th Cir. 1964). 
98. It is obvious, of course, that the court would be obliged to apply the applicable 
federal law in resolving the arbitrability question. Thus, if the arbitration clause 
of the agreement is in other respects standard (i.e., making arbitrable questions of 
"interpretation or application of the agreement'), the court would be obliged to rule 
in favor of arbitrability if the grievance asserts that some provision or provisions of 
the labor agreement have been violated, and the subject matter of the grievance is 
not clearly excluded from the arbitration process. 
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agreement have specifically excluded certain subject matters from 
the arbitration process or instead should be treated like those cases 
where the claim of non-arbitrability rests on the proposition that the 
labor agreement contains no express or implied substantive commit-
ment of the kind which must be found in order to sustain the griev-
ance. If the first of these approaches were taken, the analysis of the 
scope of the judicial function would logically be like that with respect 
to claims (2) and (3). Thus, if the Court were convinced that the 
parties had stated their intentions clearly and that a final determi-
nation of the grievance would require an exercise of authority 
specifically withdrawn from the arbitrator by the contract, it pre-
sumably would refuse to require the grievance to be submitted to 
arbitration. We suggest, however, that even if this analysis of the 
nature of the arbitrability issue were to be adopted, the Court 
would very likely often find reasons for holding that the restrictive 
provisions are not clear, or are not clearly applicable to the par-
ticular case, or are intertwined with the merits. In such cases the 
Court presumably would refer the matter to the arbitrator. 
In our view, most of these types of ostensible contractual re-
strictions upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator are simply dif-
ferent ways of structuring the labor agreement in an attempt to 
preclude a finding that there is a contractual commitment of the 
kind which must be found to exist in order to sustain the griev-
ance. Thus analyzed, the underlying question really involves the 
merits and should be relegated to the arbitration process. If the 
agreement contains a broad, unqualified no-strike provision, this 
analysis is especially persuasive. With respect to matters that are 
made litigable or which may justify a strike, however, the Court 
might be willing to take more seriously these kinds of attempted 
limitations of arbitrable jurisdiction. 
c. Claim (7). Claim (7) presents the procedural arbitrability 
problem. Our discussion of the Wiley case indicates why, despite 
the decision and the broad language used in the opinion, we think 
the question whether such an issue is for the court or for the arbi-
trator remains in doubt. We noted that the Court was confronted 
with facts that made it plausible to state that "questions concerning 
the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vac-
uum," but "develop in the context of an actual dispute about the 
rights of the parties to the contract,"99 and that "doubt whether 
grievance procedures or some part of them apply to a particular 
99. 376 U.S. 543, 556-57. 
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dispute, whether such procedures have been followed or excused, 
or whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty 
to arbitrate cannot ordinarily be answered without consideration 
of the merits of the dispute which is presented for arbitration."100 
These observations were appropriate in the light of the basic arbi-
trability issue presented-whether the labor agreement survived a 
corporate merger and bound the successor corporation.101 
Such observations would not be as appropriate in the more 
usual case in which it is urged that alleged procedural deficiencies 
bar arbitration. It may be contended, therefore, that the decision 
in Wiley on the procedural issue should be regarded as limited to 
the particular facts of that case or to situations where the validity 
of the procedural objections to arbitration are otherwise inter-
twined with the merits or with other issues of arbitrability resolved 
in favor of arbitration. For example, a distinction might be drawn 
between the case where the agreement prescribes procedural- re-
quirements without indicating expressly the consequence of non-
compliance and the case where the agreement provides expressly 
that a grievance improperly processed shall not be arbitrable.102 
The former could (and we think should) be viewed as part of the 
total case on the merits to be decided by the arbitrator.103 The 
100. Id. at 556. 
IOI. The Union contended, to quote from the opinion, "that W'iley's consistent 
refusal to recognize the Union's representative status after the merger made it 'utterly 
futile'-and a little bit ridiculous to follow the grievance steps set forth in the 
contract," and "that time limitations in the grievance procedure are not controlling 
because Wiley's violations of the bargaining agreement were 'continuing.'" Id. at 557. 
The Court stated: 
"These arguments in response to Wiley's 'procedural' claim are meaningless 
unless set in the background of the merger and the negotiations surrounding 
it. .•• In this case, one's view of the Union's responses to Wiley's 'procedural' 
arguments depends to a large extent on how one answers questions bearing on 
the basic issue, the effect of the merger; e.g., whether or not the merger was a 
possibility considered by Wiley and the Union during the negotiations of the 
contract.'' Ibid. 
Thus, there were in this case somewhat unusual circumstances surrounding the 
procedural issues, and forceful reasons independent of the expressed intent (or lack 
of it) in the labor agreement as to the effect of noncompliance with procedural 
requirements for holding, once the basic arbitrability issue had been decided, that 
the procedural issues should be referred to the arbitrator. 
102. E.g., who shall sign or present the grievance, what in-plant steps are to be fol• 
lowed, and what time limits exist on grievances? The provision in Wiley was of this 
type. See id. at 556 n.11. 
103. The following decisions rendered subsequent to Wiley have left procedural 
questions of this type for the arbitrator: Avco Corp. v. Mitchell, 336 F.2d 289 (6th 
Cir. 1964) (whether grievance filed within time limits of contract); Standard Screw 
Co. v. UAW, 335 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1964) (whether grievance moot when filed); 
United Steelworkers v. American lnt'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1964) 
(whether conditions precedent to arbitration had been satisfied); Amalgamated Ass'n 
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latter, on the other hand, could (and again we think should) be 
regarded like other cases involving contract language specifically 
restricting arbitral jurisdiction; this type of case should be decided 
independently by the court if the language is clear and no defense 
against the applicability of the provision is offered.104 If, on the 
other hand, the union invokes an alleged past practice of disregard-
ing the procedural requirement in issue or some other tenable basis 
for holding the requirement inapplicable, an appropriate analysis 
would be to regard the meaning and scope of the requirement as 
in doubt and to refer the matter to the arbitrator for decision.105 
d. Claim (11 ). Here the question is whether the arbitrator lacks 
jurisdiction because the subject matter of the grievance falls within 
the province of some other tribunal such as the National Labor 
Relations Board.106 AI; noted above, we interpret Carey as declar-
ing as a matter of federal law that the existence of concurrent but 
unexercised NLRB jurisdiction does not deprive the arbitrator 
of jurisdiction and that he may not properly refuse to take juris-
diction because of the existence of NLRB jurisdiction. However, 
Carey did not decide or even clearly indicate what the rule is when 
the Board has assumed jurisdiction. 
We noted that a party having a contractual remedy as well as 
one before the Board arguably is entitled to pursue both. This view 
may be fully persuasive where the issue is not precisely the same 
of St. Employees v. Trailways of New England, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1964) 
(whether grievance was seasonable and sufficiently specific). 
104. See Kennecott Copper Co. v. Local 1081, Int'! Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 58 
L.R.R.M. 2045 (10th Cir. 1964), in which the court held that a union's grievance need 
not be submitted to arbitration where the employer failed to answer the grievance 
within the contractual time limits and the contract provided that such failure amounted 
to a forfeiture. 
105. In Local 824, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Brunswick Corp., 227 F. Supp. 643 
(W .D. Mich. 1964), a union sought to compel arbitration of a grievance filed after 
the time limits set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. The union alleged 
that special circumstances excused its failure to file the grievance on time. The 
employer contested arbitration, relying on a part of the contract providing that, if 
the union's grievance was not filed on time, it was to "be deemed settled on the basis 
of the Company's last answer." The court, in ordering arbitration, stated: "Whether 
plaintiffs have complied with the procedural requirements, or whether they are 
excused from such compliance by reason of the special circumstances of this case, is 
for the arbitrator and not for the courts." 
106. See generally Beatty, Arbitration of Unfair Labor Practice Disputes, 14 ARB. 
J. (n.s.) 180 (1959); Christensen, Arbitration, Section 301, and the National Labor 
Relations Act, 37 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 411 (1962); Cummings, NLRB Jurisdiction and Labor 
Arbitration-"Uniformity" v. "Industrial Peace," 12 LAB. L.J. 425 (1961); Feinberg, 
The Arbitrator's Responsibility Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 18 ARB. J. (n.s.) 77 (1963); 
Wallett, The Agreement and the National Labor Relations Act-Courts, Arbitrators 
and the NLRB-Who Decides What?, 14 LAB. L.J. 1041 (1963). 
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under the NLRA as under the labor agreement, although having 
some common elements, and where the results, if different, would 
not place either party upon compliance in an illegal or untenable 
position (as where the question is whether an employee was improp-
erly discharged because of anti-union motivation). After all, it 
should be recalled that in a Board proceeding the moving party 
is the government, so the parties are different than in arbitration, 
the evidence adduced may be different, and the applicable principle 
may be different. 
On the other hand, where the issue sought to be arbitrated is 
precisely the same as that before the Board, or where different 
results would place a party in an untenable position, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the arbitrator should be entitled to decline 
jurisdiction and that a court should not order arbitration.107 Illus-
trative would be an issue concerning the scope of the bargaining 
unit when the "recognition" clause of the contract defines the 
bargaining unit exactly as it was defined in the NLRB certification 
or a question whether an employee was improperly discharged for 
nonpayment of dues under a union shop provision conforming 
precisely to the requirements of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. A 
court asked to order arbitration of issues such as these which are 
pending before the Board, or which have been resolved by the Board, 
could properly be expected to invoke equitable grounds for re-
107. In the following cases the court has ordered arbitration despite the contention 
that the dispute involved an unfair labor practice: Humble Oil &: Ref. Co. v. Inde• 
pendent Industrial Workers, 337 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964); Lodge 12, Dist. 37, 
Int'! Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958); 
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Trailways of New England, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 
608 (D. Mass. 1964); United Steelworkers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 413 Pa. 358, 
196 A.2d 857 (1964). In addition, numerous courts have compelled arbitration even 
though unfair labor practice charges had already been filed with the NLRB. See, 
e.g., United Steelworkers v. American Int'! Aluminum Co., 334 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 
1964); Local 702, Int'! Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 324 F.2d 
920 (7th Cir. 1963); Local 396, Package &: Util. Drivers Union v. Hearst Publishing 
Co., 206 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Retail Shoe Salesmen v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 
185 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Cal. 1960); Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n v. Arkansas Container 
Co., 183 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Ark. 1960). However, in Kentile, Inc. v. Local 457, United 
Rubber Workers, 228 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), the court stayed arbitration where 
the trial examiner had rendered his decision. The court said: 
"To require the plaintiff to now proceed with arbitration for the purpose of 
determining whether it has violated the collective bargaining agreement by re• 
fusing to discharge the replacement employees who had not become members of 
the union would, in the light of the four day hearing before the trial examiner 
and his decision, be an exercise in futility. The question to be resolved by 
arbitration having been fully tried and decided by the trial examiner it would be 
repetitious to arbitrate the very same issue." Id. at 544. 
See also Belsinger Signs, Inc. v. Local 26, Int'! Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 57 L.R.R.M. 
2383 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where a preliminary injunction to enforce an arbitration award 
was denied since the resolution of the issues would be affected, at least in part, by an 
unfair labor practice case pending before the NLRB. 
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fusing to grant the order. By the same token we think an arbitrator 
should be considered to have the right, deriving either from the 
nature of his office under the law or by necessary or proper impli-
cation under the agreement, to decline jurisdiction. 
Other kinds of questions of "dual" jurisdiction may arise. One 
such question lay in the background in Carey. There the issue to 
be arbitrated was whether certain work had been improperly re-
moved from the coverage of the agreement under which the arbi-
tration was sought. If the work had been removed pursuant to an 
award issued by another arbitrator functioning under the agree-
ment with the other union claiming the work, the second arbitrator 
might have been asked (by the employer) to refuse to assume juris-
diction on the ground that the issue had been decided. It seems 
clear, however, that any such plea would have had to be denied, 
since the first proceeding would have involved different parties and 
a different agreement. 
There may, of course, be situations in which, by virtue of some 
statute, the parties are deprived of the right to use private arbitra-
tion. Illustrative would be an attempt by agreement between a 
rail carrier and a union to avoid the jurisdiction of the National 
Railroad Adjustment Board.108 Illustrative also might be the case 
where a master agreement between a multi-plant employer and an 
international union establishes an exclusive "umpire" procedure for 
resolving unsettled grievances, but some constituent local union and 
a local plant manager attempt to dispose of a grievance on an ad hoc 
basis before a different arbitrator. In these cases it would doubtless 
be held that the substituted arbitration process could not be legally 
effective. 
B. Issues Involving Questions of Jurisdiction Arising Out of 
Absence From the Proceeding of an Affected Person or Party 
1. Absence From the Proceeding of an Affected Person or 
Union Not Subject to the Labor Agreement-Claim (8) 
The contention here is that the arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to 
make a valid award because of the absence from the proceeding 
(and the lack of power in the arbitrator to require participation 
of or to bind) a third person or union not a party to or subject to 
the labor agreement under which the arbitrator is appointed.109 
This issue was present in Carey. As we have stated, we believe 
the Court in effect ruled as a matter of federal law that this kind 
108. See note 2 supra. 
109. See generally Jones, supra notes 60 and 61. 
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of attack on arbitral jurisdiction lacks merit and, indeed, that the 
consequence is that the arbitrator lacks the right to decline juris-
diction in such a case. Of course, the Court did not decide that the 
arbitral award, if adverse to the interests of the non-participating 
union, would be binding on that union;110 nor did it rule that 
the arbitrator could somehow make such an award binding by 
serving notice of the arbitration proceeding and affording an 
opportunity to appear and be heard. We think any such decision 
is highly improbable, to say the least. 
2. Refusal of Contracting Party To Participate in the 
Proceeding-Claim (9) 
The issue involved in this claim is whether, because the party 
opposing arbitration of a grievance refuses to appear or participate 
in the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator (assuming one is 
somehow selected) lacks jurisdiction to proceed and to render a 
valid award. Although this issue has not yet reached the Supreme 
Court, it seems to us the question posed is so fundamentally juris-
dictional and so completely independent of the merits of the claim 
sought to be arbitrated that the Court should classify it as one to 
be decided by the judiciary when the issue is appropriately raised. 
The "assumption" that an arbitrator "somehow" has been 
selected in such a case suggests problems. If the labor agreement 
establishes a selection procedure which does not necessarily require 
the full cooperation of the other contracting party (as, for example, 
provision for use of the procedures of the American Arbitration 
Association or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service) and 
the arbitrator is selected under such procedure, we think the Court 
should support the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to proceed ex 
parte, since the basic consensual prerequisite to arbitration exists 
by virtue of the underlying agreement, and the opportunity to 
appear and be heard satisfies any requirement of procedural due 
process.111 
110. A New York court denied enforcement of an arbitration award against the 
international union where the grievance heard by the arbitrator referred solely to the 
local union. In re New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 54 L.R.R.M. 2680 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1963). 
111. There are a number of recent cases in which the jurisdiction of the arbitrator 
to proceed ex parte in such circumstances has been upheld. See, e.g., United Steel-
workers v. Danville Foundry Corp., 52 L.R.R.M. 2583 (M.D. Pa. 1963); Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters v. Penobscot Poultry Co., 200 F. Supp. 879 (D. Me. 1961); Ulene v. 
La Vita Sportswear Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 335, 34 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1963). See Smith, 
Arbitrators and Arbitrability, in LABOR .ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 75, 80 n.5 
(1963). 
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On the other hand, if the only specified method of selecting an 
arbitrator requires agreement or cooperation of the parties, there 
are greater difficulties. Very likely in such a case there could be no 
arbitrator designated except by and through judicial intervention 
to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. Here, also, we think it 
likely that the Court would support this kind of procedure. 
The controlling question would be whether the agreement, properly 
construed, constituted an obligation to arbitrate or only an obliga-
tion to arbitrate if both parties should be willing cooperatively to 
do so. If, as we believe, the former is the more accurate interpre-
tation, the equity jurisdiction of the courts should be adequate to 
the task of enforcing the obligation against an uncooperative 
party.112 
3. Absence From the Proceeding of Bargaining Unit Employee 
Subject to the Agreement Whose Interests Are Adverse to 
Position Taken by Union-Claim (10) 
The question raised here is whether, because of the absence from 
the proceeding of an employee subject to the labor agreement whose 
interests are adverse to the position being taken by the union in 
support of the grievance, the arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to render 
a valid award. An illustrative example is presented by almost any 
seniority case where the union, in deciding to process a grievance 
filed by a particular employee asserting a right to preferential 
treatment because of his seniority, has made an internal decision 
that the grievant's rights are superior to those of another employee. 
Involved is the fundamental relationship of the union, as repre-
sentative of all the employees in the bargaining unit, to the in-
dividual employee in the negotiation and administration of the 
labor agreement.113 
112. See In re Masters, Mates 8e Pilots, 52 L.R.R.M. 2392 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963), 
wherein the court denied enforcement of an arbitration award where the employer 
refused to appoint two arbitrators as was required by the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. However, the court said that the union could have met this requirement 
by petitioning the court either to compel arbitration or to appoint the needed 
arbitrators. 
113. See generally Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in 
Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REv. 235 (1961); Hanslowe, Individual Rights to Col-
lective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959); Hanslowe, The Collective Agree-
ment and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052 (1963); Lenhoff, The 
Effect of Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual, 9 Arul. J. (n.s.) 3 (1954); 
Rosen, The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration-Still Another Look at the 
Problem, 24 Mo. L. REv. 233 (1964); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agree-
ments and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962); Wellington, Union Democracy 
and Fair Representation-Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 
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In the Hein-Werner case,114 the Wisconsin court held that the 
award of the arbitrator is invalid in this kind of case unless the 
employee whose interests may be adverse to the union's position 
has been offered the opportunity to appear and be heard in the 
proceeding. The basic postulate of the decision was that, as a 
matter of law, a union fails in its legal duty of fair representationm 
whenever, as the court put it, "the interests of two groups of 
employees [within the unit] are diametrically opposed to each other 
and the union espouses the cause of one in arbitration .... "116 
The precise issue has not yet reached the Supreme Court, 
but in Humphrey v. Moore,111 decided in 1964 (not reviewed 
above because not in the mainstream of decisions on the arbitra-
tion process), the Court seemed clearly to reject the premise under-
lying the Wisconsin court's decision. It should be noted, however, 
that Moore was a case in which the interests adversely affected by 
the union's position were in fact represented independently in the 
proceeding, and the proceeding itself, while an appellate stage of 
an established grievance procedure, was before a joint management-
union committee rather than before an arbitrator. In any event, 
we think it unlikely in view of the positions taken in Moore and the 
decision in Carey that the Court would rule on facts like those of 
Hein-Werner that an award is rendered invalid solely because of 
a failure to offer employees opposed to the union's position an 
opportunity to appear and be heard independently. Nor do we 
think it likely the Court would hold such an award unenforceable 
if later attacked collaterally by any such employee except, possibly, 
1327 (1958); Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 
73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964). 
114. Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), cert. denied, 
362 U.S. 962 (1960). 
115. A union's legal 'duty to represent fairly all the employees in the bargaining 
unit has been declared in several Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Humphrey v. 
Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Syres v. Oil Workers, 
350 U.S. 892 (1955); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 
(1944); Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
116. 8 Wis. 2d 264, 272, 99 N.W .2d 132, 137 (1959). 
117. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). The Supreme Court held that a union did not violate 
its duty of fair representation by obtaining the decision of a joint employer-union 
committee to dovetail the seniority lists of two companies when one of the com-
panies absorbed the business of the other. "By choosing to integrate seniority lists 
based upon length of service at either company," the Court observed, "the union acted 
upon wholly relevant considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors." Id. at 
350. Of more importance to our immediate inquiry, however, was the Court's state• 
ment that it was "not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agent's duty 
of fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some indi• 
viduals whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees 
against that of another." Id. at 349. 
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on a factual showing that the union was guilty of bad faith in proc-
essing the grievance. Even if bad faith were in the picture, there 
would remain the problem whether the remedy of the adversely 
affected employee would be held to include a right to have the 
award set aside (at least in the absence of collusion between em-
ployer and union). 
This is admittedly a difficult area, and Professor Summers, 
among others, has sought to develop a construct of individual 
rights which, if accepted by the Court, would distinctly qualify the 
union's representational authority.118 Certainly it must be clear 
in any case that the kinds of problems here involved are matters 
of substantive law to be resolved finally by courts, not arbitrators. 
C. Issues Involving Question Whether Award Is Unenforceable 
Because of Disregard by Arbitrator of Contractual or Legal 
Limitations on His Authority-Claim (12) 
Here it is assumed that the arbitrator had jurisdiction of the 
subject matter of the grievance; but it is alleged that his award 
either disregards some contractual limitation on his authority or 
disregards or misapplies some relevant rule of law. 
I. Contractual Limitations 
Illustrative would be the following case: the grievance protests 
the discharge of an employee; the labor agreement contains a "just 
cause" limitation on the right to discharge and provides that the 
arbitrator, upon finding an employee guilty of the offense charged, 
has no authority to modify the penalty; but the arbitrator, although 
finding the employee guilty of the offense, reinstates him without 
back pay. It is apparent that this kind of attack on the validity of 
an award does not involve an issue of arbitrability. 
In considering this kind of case and others like it, we presup-
pose the inapplicability of the United States Arbitration Act,119 
although the Court has not yet ruled specifically on this question.120 
118. See Summers, supra note 113. See also Summers, Collective Power and Individ-
ual Rights in the Collective Agreement-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 
72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963). 
119. 9 u.s.c. §§ 1-14 (1958). 
120. Prior to the decision in Lincoln Mills, the lower federal courts were split as 
to the availability of the United States Arbitration Act to aid enforcement of labor 
arbitration agreements. Compare Local 19, Warehouse Workers v. Buckeye Cotton 
Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956) (act held applicable to collective bargaining 
agreements), with United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221 (4th 
Cir. 1954) (act held inapplicable to collective bargaining contracts). In the Lincoln 
Mills case the Supreme Court did not discuss the applicability of the act, although 
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Moreover, we think it clear that, at least as to substantive matters, 
pre-emption principles make state arbitration statutes inapplicable 
to labor agreements enforceable under section 301 of LMRA, 1947, 
except to the extent that they are deemed to be rules absorbed by, 
or not inconsistent with, federal law.121 If, however, the federal 
arbitration act or a typical state act were applicable, this kind of 
arbitral decision clearly would be subject to judicial review and 
the award would be denied enforcement.122 Thus, more precisely 
expressed, the question is whether the Supreme Court will or should 
authorize judicial review in cases of this kind as a development of 
federal substantive law relating to the arbitration process. 
We believe the Court should hold that judicial review is avail-
able in such cases, but only where, as in the illustration cited, the 
claim that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority is predicated 
upon a clear and specific provision of the agreement.123 If the agree-
the Fifth Circuit had held that an arbitration agreement could not be enforced under 
it. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other 
grounds, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). It would thus seem that the Supreme Court tacitly 
rejected its use with respect to collective bargaining agreements. See generally Burstein, 
The United States Arbitration Act-A Reevaluation, 3 VILL. L. REV. 125 (1958). 
121. In Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Floor Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Supreme 
Court said that "incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of 
federal labor law." See also Interstate Bakeries Corp. v. Bakery Drivers Union, 201 
N.E.2d 452 (Ill. 1964), in which the court held that a state constitutional provision 
forbidding arbitration of future disputes was inapplicable in an action under § 301. 
122. Section IO(d) of the United States Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration 
award may be vacated "where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper• 
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made." 9 U.S.C. § IO(d) (1958). The New York statute provides 
that an award may be vacated where "an arbitrator, or agency or person making the 
award exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite 
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made .••• " N.Y. CIV. PRAc. I.Aw 
§ 75ll(b). 
123. See Truck Drivers Union v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964). 
There the arbitrator found the employee guilty of the conduct for which he was 
discharged, but reinstated the employee without back-pay upon the ground that the 
penalty was too severe. The Court denied enforcement of the award for the reason 
that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The decision was based on the follow-
ing provision in the parties' collective bargaining agreement: 
"If any grievance, arising out of any action taken by the Company in discharging, 
suspending, disciplining, transferring, promoting, or laying off any employee, is 
carried to arbitration, the arbitration board shall not substitute its judgment for 
that of management and shall only reverse the action or decision of the man-
agement if it finds that the Company's complaint against the employee is not 
supported by the facts, and that the management has acted arbitrarily and in 
bad faith or in violation of the express terms of the Agreement." 
Some cases involving challenges to the authority of an arbitrator under the agreement 
to modify a disciplinary penalty are less easily decided. For example, if the agreement 
contains a just cause provision, and provides that "upon finding lack of just cause 
for a discharge, the discharged employee shall be reinstated with full back-pay," 
it is at least arguable that the prescribed remedy is required only upon a finding 
that no cause for discipline of any kind has been established. Thus, without being 
capricious, an arbitrator could conclude that his remedial authority is not contractually 
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ment is unclear (a matter presumably to be decided by the Court) 
and the basis of the arbitrator's award with respect to the matter 
contested is stated to be (or, if silent as to the rationale, could have 
rested on) an interpretation of the agreement, the teaching of the 
1960 Trilogy cases, especially Enterprise, is that there should be 
no "second guessing" by a court.124 
2. Legal Limitations 
Under this caption are encompassed a variety of attacks upon 
the validity of an arbitral award. Illustratively, they include the 
claims: (1) that the arbitrator decided an issue not submitted; (2) 
that the award requires a violation of a federal or state statute; 
(3) that the award, although not requiring an illegal act, is incon-
sistent with public policy; (4) that the arbitrator, in analyzing the 
issue presented under the labor agreement, disregarded or mis-
applied some principle of federal substantive law relating to the 
labor agreement; (5) that fundamental principles of due process 
were violated in the conduct of the hearing. On most of these 
questions the federal substantive law has not yet been declared by 
the Supreme Court. 
With respect to the first of these illustrative situations, the 
principle is well-established in the common law and state statutory 
arbitration law that an award is invalid to the extent that it pur-
ports to cover an issue not submitted by the parties.125 We believe 
this principle should and will be engrafted into the federal sub-
stantive law. Indeed, the Court's opinion in Enterprise lends some 
circumscribed where he finds the employee guilty of some dereliction insufficient to 
warrant discharge. 
124. See Minute Maid Co. v. Citrus Workers, 331 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964) (back-
pay award held proper, although contract was silent on the matter); Electric Specialty 
Co. v. Local 1069, Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers, 222 F. Supp. 314 (D. Conn. 1963) 
(reinstatement with back-pay held proper, even though contract and written submission 
were silent). Cf. Kansas City Luggage Workers v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d 
992 (8th Cir. 1964) (back-pay award vacated because issue of back-pay was not spe-
cifically submitted to the arbitrator). 
125. See the New York statutory provision quoted at note 122 supra. See also 
UPDEGRAFF & McCOY, .ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 208-09 (2d ed. 1961). The 
following excerpt from a New York court decision illustrates this point: 
"As provided in the purported notice, the arbitrator was limited to the claimed 
unlawful discharge of two members of the union whose reimbursement with 
back-pay was sought. The arbitrator, nevertheless, proceeded to hear and deter-
mine matters not set forth in the purported notice. These matters included a 
claim of a third employee, contributions or payments to the union welfare fund, 
and tips and gratuities received by employees which, by the terms of the contract, 
were not wages for the purposes of the agreement .••• 
"As the arbitrator went beyond the limits of the matters stated in the alleged 
notice to be submitted to him and the scope of the claimed controversy, the 
award cannot stand ..•. " In re Culinary Employees, 4 Lab. Arb. 830 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1946). 
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support for this view.126 A distinction should be drawn, however, 
between the case where the arbitrator decides a matter not compre-
hended at all by the grievance and the case where the arbitrator 
decides the matter submitted but in so doing rejects the parties' 
contractual theory and selects another that was not argued. The 
latter, we believe, should not be held to make the award defective, 
although the wisdom of such a decisional process is open to serious 
question. 
The contention that an award is unenforceable because it 
requires a violation of a federal or state statute seems to us clearly 
to be a kind of claim which, as a matter of federal law, should be 
allowed. Included, for example, would be cases where it is alleged 
that the award: (a) requires the employer or the union to discrimi-
nate against employees in a manner forbidden by the National 
Labor Relations Act;127 (b) requires an employer to deduct union 
dues or assessments from employees' wages in violation of section 
302 of the LMRA;128 or (c) requires a violation of federal or state 
antitrust laws. Surely it must be held that a party to an arbitration 
proceeding is entitled to a judicial determination of questions such 
as these. 
The claim that an award is unenforceable because it is inconsis-
tent with some recognized public policy, although not requiring 
performance of an illegal act, presents much greater difficulties. 
Examples are claims: (a) that the decision, purporting to be an appli-
cation of some contract provision, has involved a determination 
that would not have been made had the issue been presented to 
the NLRB; or (b) that the decision is incompatible with public 
policy in some other respect, as, for example, a decision that re-
quires reinstatement of an employee who has committed a heinous 
offense. 
126. "[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective 
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. 
He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate 
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When 
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice 
but to refuse enforcement of the award." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 
8c Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
127. See, e.g., Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, Int'! Ladies' Garment Workers, 283 
F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961), where the court held that 
an arbitrator's award directing an employer to bargain with a decertified union was 
unenforceable since it would require the employer to violate § 8(a)(l) of the NLRA. 
See Jay, Arbitration and the Federal Common Law of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 37 N.Y.UL. REV. 448, 456-58 (1962). 
128. See, e.g., Carpenters v. Ebanisteria Quintana, 56 L.R.R.M. 2391 (D.P.R. 1964), 
where the court denied enforcement of an arbitration award insofar as it would 
require an employer to checkoff dues that had been timely revoked in accordance 
with § 302(c)(4) of the LMRA. 
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Carey has some bearing where the issue before the arbitrator 
might also have been presented to the NLRB. The Court there 
held that concurrent jurisdiction of the NLRB and the arbitrator 
did not deprive the arbitrator of authority to proceed. At the same 
time, it was recognized that there might be potential conflicts with 
ultimate Board rulings; in that event the Board's determination 
would be controlling and would justify a refusal to comply with 
the inconsistent arbitral award.129 This, however, is not to say that 
independently of a Board proceeding involving the issue opportunity 
for judicial review of the award would or should be provided. In-
deed, we would argue that, in general, this is an area where the 
orthodox limitations on judicial review should be invoked. And we 
think the same principle should be applied in the "public policy 
discharge" cases, at least in the absence of an enforceable statute 
giving the employer the absolute right to discharge for the kind of 
offense involved.130 
A contention that the arbitral decision is defective because the 
arbitrator disregarded or misapplied some principle of federal sub-
stantive law relating to the labor agreement also presents difficulties. 
Examples are challenged arbitral determinations: (a) that an indi-
vidual employee either did or did not have a right independently 
of the union to process a grievance to arbitration where such right 
is not expressly provided by the agreement,131 (b) that a broad no-
129. "Should the Board disagree with the arbiter, ••• the Board's ruling would, 
of course, take precedence •••• " Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 375 U.S. 261, 272 
(1964). 
1!10. In a recent Second Circuit case, the court confirmed an arbitrator's award 
reinstating an employee who had been convicted of gambling on the employer's 
premises, even though it noted that "'the power of the federal courts to enforce the 
terms of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and 
limitations of the public policy of the United States ... .'" Local 453, Elec. Workers v. 
Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963); accord, 
Jenkins Bros. v. Local 5623, United Steelworkers, 230 F. Supp. 871 (D. Conn. 1964). 
Contra, Avco Corp. v. Preteska, 22 Conn. Supp. 475, 174 A.2d 684 (Super. Ct. 1961). 
See also WPIX, Inc. v. Radio &: Television Broadcast Eng'rs, 52 L.R.R.M. 2321 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1962), where the court upheld an arbitrator's decision that an employer did 
not have just cause for discharging an employee who, in his application for employ-
ment fourteen years earlier, had misrepresented that he was not a member of the 
Communist Party. On the other hand, in Black v. Cutter Labs., 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 
P.2d 905 (1955), cert. dismissed with opinion, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), the California 
Supreme Court vacated on public policy grounds an arbitrator's award that would 
have forced an employer to retain an employee who was an active member of the 
Communist Party. With respect to the latter case, see Kovarsky, Labor Arbitration 
and Federal Pre•emption-.The Overruling of Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 47 MINN. 
L. REv. 531 (1963). See generally Meiners, Arbitration Awards and Public Policy, 17 
ARB, J. (n.s.) 145 (1962); Symposium-Arbitration and the Courts, 58 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 
466, 545 (1963). 
131. The prevailing judicial view seems to be that an individual employee has 
no standing to compel arbitration in the absence of a specific provision in the col-
lective bargaining agreement giving him such a right. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. 
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strike provision binds the union even though the strike is in 
protest against an employer unfair labor practice (despite the 
Supreme Court's decision in Mastro Plastics),132 (c) that the union's 
violation of a no-strike provision either did or did not have the 
effect of suspending the employer's obligations under the contract or 
of giving the employer a right to terminate the agreement, and 
(d) that cited judicial interpretations of the effect of the recognition, 
union shop, or other provisions of the agreement on the existence 
or nonexistence of a limitation on the employer's right to subcon-
tract may be disregarded. 
In this area the ultimate answers, for the most part, seem to us 
to be unclear. The basic question is whether the Court, in discharg-
ing its role of superintendence of the development of emerging 
federal law concerning the collective bargaining agreement, will 
determine for reasons of policy that arbitral as well as judicial 
decisions should be in conformity with principles approved by the 
Court. An affirmative view would place issues of this kind in a 
special category to be differentiated from other kinds of alleged 
errors of contract interpretation, fact, or law with respect to which 
the orthodox rule of non-reviewability would obtain. In view of 
the relatively high degree of involvement of arbitrators, rather 
than courts, in the interpretation and application of collective 
bargaining agreements and the importance the Court evidently 
attaches to the development of an appropriate conceptualization of 
the collective agreement, we think it would regard some of these 
issues as fundamental and subject to judicial review, but, at the 
same time, it would be inclined to attach considerable weight to 
the views expressed by arbitrators.133 
Drake Bakeries and Needham indicated, as we have argued, that 
any question such as (c) in the examples above cited is one for 
judicial determination. There is some difficulty, however, in any 
attempt to extend this approach to such issues as the scope of a no-
strike clause or the problem of implied limitations on subcontract-
International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962) Ostrofsky v. United 
Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), afj'd, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
363 U.S. 849 (1960). Cf. Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). 
See generally Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 
37 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 362 (1962). 
132. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). See Jay, supra note 127, 
at 458-62. 
133. One commentator, however, has noted that there is little indication that the 
substantive detenninations of arbitraors have had much effect upon the courts. See 
Fleming, Some Observations on Contract Grievances Before Courts and Arbitrators, 
15 STAN. L. REv. 595, 615 (1963). 
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ing. These questions basically can be analyzed as involving contrac-
tual intent rather than any basic precepts concerning the nature of 
the collective bargaining agreement. Cases such as Webster Elec-
tric134 would have to be taken into account, however, and, if the 
Supreme Court were to adopt the Seventh Circuit's holding that a 
labor agreement containing a union shop clause implies a prohibi-
tion on the contracting out of bargaining unit work, the answer 
to the question whether this would become a rule of construction 
binding upon all arbitrators would depend upon how the Court 
rationalized its conclusion. If the analysis were simply in terms of 
determining contractual intent, the result should not be regarded as 
binding185 or as subjecting a contrary arbitral ruling to judicial 
review. If, on the other hand, the Court were to say that as a matter 
of federal law the existence of a union shop or some other provision 
of the collective bargaining agreement carries with it a prohibition 
on subcontracting or is to be conclusively presumed to signify a 
certain intent whether factually founded or not, a different result 
might well follow. 
Finally, an allegation that an award is unenforceable because of 
want of due process in the hearing and determination of the case 
obviously is a legal question that the courts will determine inde-
pendently. This is orthodox arbitration law, and we are confident 
it will become part of the federal substantive law. 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
We have sought in this article to indicate the extent to which 
the Supreme Court during the past few years has fashioned federal 
law concerning the labor dispute arbitration process. We have also 
expressed opinions concerning the implications of the Court's 
decisions with respect to some matters not yet decided, and we have 
offered some views concerning certain legal issues on which the 
Court's decisions to date afford no concrete guidance at all. 
The problems thus far presented to the Court in this area of 
134. UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962). 
135. Several arbitrators have held that the decision in the Webster Electric case 
was not binding upon them. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 220 (Platt 1964); 
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1213 (Smith 1964). As to the binding effect 
of court decisions, one prominent arbitrator has observed: "Arbitrators are not bound 
by judicial precedent. What may be the federal substantive law is not controlling 
in an arbitration proceeding wherein the Arbitrator is required to construe the lan-
guage of the Contract by application of recognized maxims of contract interpretation 
and the general understanding of the Parties in the negotiation and administration of 
Collective Bargaining Agreements." United Packers, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 619 (Kelliher 
1962). 
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labor law represent only a segment of the total range of questions 
which the judiciary will have to resolve in the execution of the 
task of developing a federal corpus juris of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Gradually these questions will find their way to 
the docket of the Court. Many will present fundamental issues. 
As recently as January of this year the Court in Republic Steel 
Corporation v. Maddox136 refused to permit an employee covered 
by a labor agreement to sue on the contract when he had made no 
effort to use the stipulated grievance procedure. Mr. Justice Black, 
dissenting, saw the case as "an ordinary, common, run-of-the-mill 
lawsuit for breach of contract . . ." and took serious exception to 
any policy which would force the use of arbitration to resolve dis-
putes involving "individual," as distinguished from group, interests 
and rights under a labor agreement. That he was the sole dissenter 
does not minimize the nature of the underlying problem. The 
majority opinion recognized that there may be qualifications on 
the union's right of exclusive control of the matter of enforcement 
of the labor agreement. 
In solving these and other legal problems the courts have an 
awesome responsibility, since they are free-indeed in good con-
science required-eclectically to make use of all available sources 
of guidance, even including the views of arbitrators! Their task 
is to construct an industrial code which will serve adequately 
the vital interests involved, including that of the public in preserv-
ing and strengthening the collective bargaining process. Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter, dissenting in Lincoln Mills, doubted that the judiciary 
could meet the challenge.137 But the die is now cast. Federal law 
is being developed at an accelerating rate. How far the Court will 
or should go in structuring the law (whether, for example, to deal 
with matters of procedure as well as substance in relation to the 
arbitration process) is a problem meriting the serious concern and 
attention of all "friends of the court." It may be concluded, ulti-
mately, that some legislative assistance is necessary. However, despite 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's misgivings, we think the judiciary will 
probably be equal in the main to the challenge presented, and 
that on the whole the area is one which can best be treated, in the 
tradition of the common law, on a case-by-case basis, enabling a 
careful examination of real problems, the drawing of important 
distinctions, the testing of principle against practice, and practice 
against principle. 
136. 85 Sup. Ct. 614 (1965). 
137. 353 U.S. 448, 465 (1957). 
